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Disparate Impact, Unified Law 
abstract.  The last decade has seen the largest wave of franchise restrictions since the dark 
days of Jim Crow. In response to this array of limits, lower courts have recently converged on a 
two-part test under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This test asks if an electoral practice (1) 
causes a disparate racial impact (2) through its interaction with social and historical discrimina-
tion. Unfortunately, the apparent judicial consensus is only skin-deep. Courts bitterly disagree 
over basic questions like whether the test applies to specific policies or systems of election admin-
istration; whether it is violated by all, or only substantial, disparities; and whether disparities refer 
to citizens’ compliance with a requirement or to their turnout at the polls. The test also sits on thin 
constitutional ice. It comes close to finding fault whenever a measure produces a disparate impact 
and so coexists uneasily with Fourteenth Amendment norms about colorblindness and Congress’s 
remedial authority. 
 The section 2 status quo, then, is untenable. To fix it, this Article proposes to look beyond 
election law to the statutes that govern disparate impact liability in employment law, housing law, 
and other areas. Under these statutes, breaches are not determined using the two-part section 2 
test. Instead, courts employ a burden-shifting framework that first requires the plaintiff to prove 
that a particular practice causes a significant racial disparity and then gives the defendant the op-
portunity to show that the practice is necessary to achieve a substantial interest. This framework, 
the Article argues, would answer the questions that have vexed courts in section 2 cases. The frame-
work would also bolster section 2’s constitutionality by allowing jurisdictions to justify their chal-
lenged policies. Accordingly, the solution to section 2’s woes would not require any leaps of doc-
trinal innovation. It would only take the unification of disparate impact law. 
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introduction 
Say a state passes a law that makes it harder to vote, like a requirement to 
show photo ID or a cutback to early voting. (This is not a far-fetched scenario; 
more voting restrictions have been enacted over the last decade than at any point 
since the end of Jim Crow.
1
) Suppose also that the state’s new law has a disparate 
racial impact: that it affects a higher proportion of minority than nonminority 
citizens. (This too is a plausible assumption; minority citizens are less affluent, 




Courts and commentators agree that, standing alone, this racial disparity 
does not breach section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the key statutory pro-
vision banning racial discrimination in voting.
3
 In the oft-repeated words of one 
district court, “a plaintiff must demonstrate something more than dispropor-
tionate impact to establish a Section 2 violation.”
4
 Or as a prominent VRA liti-
gator has put it, “Section 2 plaintiffs [must] establish . . . that the disparate im-
pact of a challenged vote denial practice is not merely a statistical accident.”
5
 
Now imagine that a litigant does come up with “something more” than a na-
ked racial disparity—specifically, evidence that the disparity is caused by the 
law’s interaction with historical and ongoing patterns of racial discrimination. 
In a photo ID case, this evidence might show that minority citizens are poorer 
than nonminority citizens; that their relative poverty is the product of discrimi-
nation; that because they are poorer, they are less likely to own cars; and that 
because they drive less, they are also less likely to have driver’s licenses. In an 
early-voting case, the causal chain might run from discrimination to worse job 
 
1. See, e.g., New Voting Restrictions in America, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 10, 2017), https://
www.brennancenter.org/new-voting-restrictions-america [https://perma.cc/8QE6-8F8N] 
[hereinafter New Voting Restrictions] (counting twenty-four states that have adopted new vot-
ing restrictions since the 2010 election). 
2. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hopkins et al., Voting but for the Law: Evidence from Virginia on Photo Identi-
fication Requirements, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 79, 83 (2017) (surveying eleven studies of 
photo ID possession, almost all of which found substantial racial disparities). 
3. Section 2 is codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018). It is even more important now that the VRA’s 
other pillar, section 5, has been neutered. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) 
(striking down the coverage formula used to determine which jurisdictions would be subject 
to section 5’s preclearance requirement). 
4. Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1249 (M.D. Fla. 2012). I am one of those who have 
repeated this language. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 
SUP. CT. REV. 55, 108. 
5. Dale E. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County: Mechanics and Standards in Section 2 
Vote Denial Claims, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 675, 680 (2014). 
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qualifications to less flexible work conditions to greater difficulty voting on Elec-
tion Day to heavier reliance on early voting. 
Given this kind of record, the emerging judicial consensus is that section 2 is 
violated. In the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits—though not 
necessarily in the Supreme Court, which has yet to decide a vote denial case un-
der the VRA—liability ensues if an electoral policy (1) has a disparate racial im-
pact that (2) is attributable to the policy’s interaction with discriminatory con-
ditions.
6
 And properly so, according to many scholars. To cite a high-profile pair, 
Sam Issacharoff lauds the courts’ two-part test as a “breakthrough,”
7
 while Pam 
Karlan extols its capacity “to disrupt politics as usual in the service of full civic 
inclusion for long-excluded minority citizens.”
8
 
But there is a problem with construing section 2 in this fashion. Section 2 is 
a disparate impact provision—a law that imposes liability on the basis of dis-
criminatory effect, not invidious intent. Section 2, however, is not the only such 
provision. Rather, disparate impact theories are also recognized by Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act, by the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and by several more stat-
utes.
9
 In these other areas, a violation is not established simply because a policy 
interacts with discriminatory conditions to produce a disparate impact. Instead, 
courts follow a well-developed framework under which (1) the plaintiff must 
prove that a particular practice causes a significant discriminatory effect; (2) the 
defendant next has the opportunity to show that the practice is necessary to 
achieve a substantial interest; and (3) the plaintiff may then demonstrate that 
this interest could be attained in a different, less discriminatory way. The emerg-
ing consensus in the vote denial context thus threatens to drive a wedge between 
section 2 and every other disparate impact provision. It risks turning section 2 
into a lonely island in the disparate impact sea. 
My aim in this Article, then, is to resist this consensus—to urge consistency 
rather than variety in disparate impact law and to bring vote denial cases into the 
familiar disparate impact fold. To state my thesis another way: to date, courts 
have focused on the explanations for racial disparities in voting, especially the ex-
tent to which they are intertwined with past and present discrimination. In my 
view, though, courts should scrutinize the interests that allegedly justify these 
 
6. See Dale E. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm: The New Vote Denial Litigation Since 
Shelby County, 127 YALE L.J.F. 799, 802-09 (2018) (surveying the recent case law). 
7. Samuel Issacharoff, Voter Welfare: An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights Law, 92 IND. 
L.J. 299, 317 (2016). 
8. Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims, 77 
OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 789 (2016). 
9. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018) (codifying the disparate impact cause of action under 
Title VII); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507 (2015) (recognizing a disparate impact theory under the Fair Housing Act). 
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electoral disparities: how compelling they are, the degree to which they are ad-
vanced by challenged practices, and whether they could be furthered through 
other means. That is what courts do in every other disparate impact domain, and 
I see no good reason for vote denial cases to break the mold. 
Beyond simplicity, what is the case for unifying disparate impact law? One 
set of answers stresses the similarities between voting and employment, hous-
ing, and the other fields where disparate impact claims may be raised. As a his-
torical matter, the VRA, Title VII, and the FHA are kindred spirits: crown jewels 
of the civil rights era, enacted in a single burst of legislative activity, and sharing 
the mission of ending racial discrimination. It would be entirely consistent with 
these statutes’ common legacy for disparate impact law to implement them in 
the same way. 
Theoretically, too, the standard accounts of disparate impact law apply as 
squarely to voting as to employment or housing. One model treats an unjustified 
discriminatory effect as a proxy for the true concept of interest: a racially dis-
criminatory purpose. Another approach deems a needless disparate impact an 
evil in and of itself: an unwarranted racial stratification in a society aspiring for 
racial equality. Both perspectives extend naturally to vote denial. When an elec-
toral policy differentially affects minority and nonminority citizens, and for no 
good reason, the injury can be understood as an illicit motive that is suspected 
but not proven. The harm can also be seen as the unnecessary disparate impact, 
which prevents minority citizens from participating equally in the political pro-
cess. 
Substantively as well, voting resembles employment and housing in that it 
is a valued good to which access is determined by criteria that not everyone can 
satisfy. When these criteria disproportionally exclude minority members, they 
produce racial disparities whether they pertain to the franchise, the workplace, 
or the roof over one’s head. It is true that voting (unlike employment and hous-
ing) is exclusively regulated by the state. But this only means that it is public 
rather than private interests that are the potential justifications for disparate im-
pacts. It is also true that voting (again unlike employment and housing) is a 
nonmarket, nonrivalrous good: one with no price and no limit to who may enjoy 
it. This too, though, simply takes off the table one common rationale for racial 
discrepancies: private actors’ pursuit of profit. 
The next reason to unify disparate impact law is more doctrinal. Not only 
does the framework used by Title VII and the FHA apply fully to vote denial 
cases; it also resolves many of the most contentious issues that have arisen in 
these disputes. To name a few: Must section 2 litigants establish a large disparate 
impact, or will any discriminatory effect do? The former, if Title VII is any guide. 
Courts enforcing that provision have insisted on a racial disparity that is both 
statistically significant and substantively meaningful before finding an employer 




 What kind of disparate impact must be shown in section 2 litigation—a 
difference between minority and nonminority citizens’ abilities to comply with 
an electoral policy or an eventual gap in voter turnout? Again the former, accord-
ing to Title VII. In a well-known case, the Supreme Court rejected the “sugges-
tion that disparate impact should be measured only at the bottom line.”
11
 
Must the racial disparity caused by a voting rule also be linked to social and 
historical discrimination? No, held the Court in another famous Title VII case 
(thus undermining one of the pillars of the emerging section 2 consensus).
12
 It 
is enough if the rule causes the disparity; there is no need for discrimination to 
be part of the causal story too. And what is the right relief once an electoral policy 
has been deemed unlawful—facial invalidation or judicial revision to lessen the 
disparate impact? Courts have usually tossed out practices in their entirety in 
Title VII and FHA proceedings. Less often, they have ordered race-conscious 
remedies in order to undo the damage of the illegal activity.
13
 These more ag-
gressive steps may also warrant consideration under section 2. 
It is no surprise, of course, that employment and housing doctrine is so help-
ful here. It has been shaped over several decades by hundreds of appellate deci-
sions, including many by the Supreme Court. In contrast, most courts of appeals 
have yet to adopt a standard for section 2 vote denial claims, and, as noted earlier, 
the Supreme Court has never grappled with such a challenge. But that is precisely 
my point. It makes little sense for section 2 to evolve independently from the rest 
of disparate impact law. It should join the main line of precedent and take ad-
vantage of its accumulated wisdom: the answers it has laboriously developed to 
scores of thorny questions. 
Doctrinal solutions are nice. But there is a final, and still more significant, 
reason to unify disparate impact law. It is to make section 2 less menacing to 
states’ electoral practices and so more likely to be sustained when (not if) its 
constitutionality is questioned. At present, it is remarkably easy for a plaintiff to 
prevail in a vote denial case if she is able to establish a racial disparity caused by 
a particular policy. Her only other obligation is to show that the disparity stems 
from the policy’s interaction with past and present discrimination. And almost 
always, the disparity does arise for this reason—because the policy raises the cost 
 
10. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2018) (requiring “differences in selection rate” that “are sig-
nificant in both statistical and practical terms”). 
11. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982). 
12. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977) (striking down height and weight em-
ployment requirements that disproportionately excluded female applicants). 
13. See, e.g., Local 28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 432 (1986) (upholding a “29% nonwhite membership 
goal” ordered by a district court for a union found to have violated Title VII). 
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of voting, and minority citizens who are socioeconomically disadvantaged due 
to discrimination are less able to afford the higher price. 
Under the usual disparate impact framework, however, the plaintiff would 
still have a long road ahead of her. The jurisdiction would have the opportunity 
to justify its policy, and if it managed to do so, the plaintiff would have the chance 
to identify a comparably effective but less discriminatory alternative. These ad-
ditional elements, moreover, are no mere formalities. Rather, they explain why 
many Title VII and FHA litigants lose their cases
14
: courts conclude that racial 
disparities are justified and cannot be reduced through other means. If the same 
were true in the vote denial context—and there is no reason to think it would not 
be—then the unification of disparate impact law would slash the success rate of 
section 2 plaintiffs. 
Paradoxically, this would be good news for advocates of section 2 (a group in 
which I count myself). The simpler it is to satisfy section 2, the more it seems 
like a pure disparate impact provision: a law that imposes liability solely because 
of racial discrepancies. The current Supreme Court is deeply suspicious of such 
measures, which in its view “place a racial thumb on the scales” and require de-
fendants to “make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes.”
15
 
Conversely, the more closely section 2 hews to the usual doctrinal framework—
with its extra prongs that exculpate justified racial differences—the more likely 
the provision is to be upheld. As the Court recently made clear, when “disparate-
impact liability” is “properly limited” so it does not threaten the “displacement 
of valid governmental policies,” it poses no constitutional problems.
16
 
Parts I and II of the Article trace the discussion to this point. Part I first de-
scribes the test that the courts of appeals (and most scholars) have endorsed for 
section 2 vote denial claims. The Part then catalogues the doctrinal questions that 
remain open about the test, as well as the practical and constitutional concerns 
that loom over it. Next, Part II is the Article’s normative core. After introducing 
the disparate impact framework used under Title VII, the FHA, and several other 
 
14. For important studies documenting the low success rates of Title VII and FHA plaintiffs 
bringing disparate impact claims, see Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mis-
take?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701 (2006), on Title VII plaintiffs; and Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Dis-
parate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357 (2013), on FHA plaintiffs. 
15. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia is no longer 
on the Court, of course, but his views are, if anything, even more widely accepted by the cur-
rent Justices. 
16. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 
(2015). 
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statutes, the Part argues that this framework is fully transferable to the vote de-
nial context. It then explains how the framework would answer the outstanding 
questions about section 2 and resolve the concerns lingering over it. 
Part III subsequently considers a number of objections to the Article’s thesis: 
that section 2’s text and precedent do not permit the use of the usual doctrinal 
framework, that the framework is redundant because it recapitulates the consti-
tutional inquiry, and that litigants’ experience with the framework is so disap-
pointing that it should not be exported anywhere else. There is something to 
these points, but they do not ultimately carry the day. 
Lastly, Part IV applies the usual framework to three controversial electoral 
policies, each emblematic of a separate sort of section 2 case: photo ID require-
ments for voting (a new franchise restriction), cutbacks to early voting (a rever-
sal of a prior franchise expansion), and all-mail voting (a new franchise expan-
sion). Despite the differences between these measures, the framework is equally 
apt for all of them. 
i .  vote denial doctrine and its defects 
Vote denial—the election-law term of art for practices that prevent other-
wise-eligible people from voting
17
—has been around for a very long time. From 
the moment of the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification, in particular, there have 
been efforts to stop African Americans from casting ballots and thus from par-
ticipating in the political process. Vote denial doctrine under the VRA, though, is 
not nearly as deeply rooted as vote denial itself. Indeed, courts have often be-
moaned the “paucity of appellate case law evaluating the merits of Section 2 
claims in the vote-denial context.”
18
 It was not until 2014 that the first court of 




In this Part, I summarize the two-part test around which courts have begun 
to coalesce. The test requires that an electoral policy (1) cause a disparate racial 
 
17. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 47 (6th ed. 2017) 
(defining racial vote denial as “measures that make it more difficult for minority members to 
vote or otherwise participate in elections”). 
18. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 239 (4th Cir. 2014); see also 
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 244 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[T]here is little authority on 
the proper test to determine whether the right to vote has been denied or abridged on account 
of race.”); Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(“A clear test for Section 2 vote denial claims . . . has yet to emerge.”), vacated as moot, No. 14-
3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014). 
19. See infra Section I.A. 
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impact (2) through the policy’s interaction with social and historical discrimina-
tion. I also note the legal academy’s largely positive response to this approach. 
Switching from description to critique, I then identify a host of issues that re-
main unresolved under the test. I further point out several difficulties that can 
be expected to intensify if the test continues to be used in its current form. This 
legal uncertainty—one might even call it jeopardy—is the basis for this Article’s 
call to unify disparate impact law. 
A. The Emerging Judicial Consensus 
When the VRA was first enacted in 1965—after the beatings of protesters in 
Selma, Alabama outraged the nation and after a southern filibuster was broken 
in the Senate—the statute was highly focused on vote denial.
20
 Vote denial, 
through poll taxes, literacy tests, and other discriminatory practices, is what mo-
tivated the marchers on the Edmund Pettus Bridge and their fellow activists 
around the country.
21
 Vote denial is also what the VRA sought to combat 
through several of its provisions. Section 3 authorized the deployment of federal 
observers whenever suits were brought to “enforce the voting guarantees of the 
fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”
22
 Section 4 suspended literacy tests, moral 
character requirements, and other similar devices for five years.
23
 And section 5 
obliged certain southern jurisdictions to obtain federal permission before imple-
menting any new “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting.”
24
 
This was “strong medicine,” in the Supreme Court’s words.
25
 In fact, it was 
so potent that jurisdictions wishing to suppress the electoral influence of minor-
ity citizens mostly switched from vote denial to vote dilution.
26
 Vote dilution, 
another election-law term of art, refers to practices that do not prevent anyone 
 
20. For a rich treatment of the VRA’s enactment, see DAVID ARETHA, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVE-
MENT: SELMA AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2008). 
21. See id. at 73-76. 
22. Section 3 is codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10302 (2018). It originally mentioned only the Fifteenth 
Amendment. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 3, 79 Stat. 437, 437. 
23. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(a). 
24. Section 5 is codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2018). 
25. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013). 
26. See id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that as minority citizens increasingly regis-
tered to vote and voted, “[e]fforts to reduce the impact of minority votes, in contrast to direct 
attempts to block access to the ballot,” became more common). 
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from voting but that nevertheless reduce the clout of minority groups by chang-
ing how votes are aggregated.
27
 Dilutive practices include at-large elections as 
well as district plans that inefficiently disperse or concentrate minority voters. 
Between roughly the 1970s and the 2000s, these sorts of policies accounted for 
the vast majority of voting rights litigation under both the Constitution and the 
VRA.
28
 They were also the measures about which Congress was most concerned 
when it amended section 2 in 1982 to make clear the provision could be violated 
even in the absence of discriminatory intent.
29
 
But while vote dilution was more salient at the time of section 2’s revision, it 
is plain that the provision applies to vote denial, too.
30
 Subsection (a) covers any 
“voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or proce-
dure”
31
—language that encompasses both direct and indirect barriers to voting. 
Subsection (a) also prohibits the “denial or abridgement of the right . . . to 
vote”
32
—in other words, vote denial or vote dilution. Subsection (b) further ex-
plains that section 2 is violated if “the political processes leading to nomination 
or election . . . are not equally open to participation by [minority] members,” “in 
that [minority] members have less opportunity than other members of the elec-
torate to participate in the political process.”
33
 Vote denial, of course, operates 
precisely by impeding such equal participation. And in the authoritative Senate 
report that accompanied the amended section 2, Congress confirmed that the 
 
27. See LOWENSTEIN ET AL. supra note 17, at 216. 
28. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
11 (2008) (observing that section 2 claims “are dominated by . . . challenges to at-large elec-
tions . . . and challenges to reapportionment plans”); Peyton McCrary et al., The Law of Pre-
clearance: Enforcing Section 5, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 20, 25 (David L. 
Epstein et al. eds., 2006) (finding the same for section 5). For an empirical examination of the 
impact of this vote dilution litigation, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 
68 STAN. L. REV. 1323 (2016). 
29. See generally S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1982) (discussing vote dilution almost exclusively). 
30. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-946 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (arguing at length that section 2 applies only to vote denial); Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying 
Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 441, 442 (2015) (“[T]he text 
and legislative history leave no doubt that § 2’s ‘results’ language applies to both vote denial 
and vote dilution claims.”). 
31. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018). 
32. Id. (emphasis added). 
33. Id. § 10301(b). 
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provision “remains the major statutory prohibition of all voting rights discrimi-
nation.”
34
 It thus “prohibits practices [that] . . . result in the denial of equal ac-
cess to any phase of the electoral process for minority group members.”
35
 
The few section 2 vote denial cases that were decided in the 1980s, 1990s, 
and 2000s failed to yield a consensus as to the proper legal standard.
36
 Courts 
agreed that a racial disparity alone was not enough to establish liability. But they 
diverged as to what else might be required. Some courts demanded proof of 
proximate causation: proof, that is, that the challenged policy was directly re-
sponsible for the disparate impact. If some other variable was significantly im-
plicated, then the policy could not be deemed the key driver.
37
 Other courts em-
phasized the interaction between the policy and social and historical patterns of 
discrimination. On this view, section 2 was breached only if discrimination wors-
ened the present conditions of minority citizens, and these inferior conditions 
explained why the policy produced a racial disparity.
38
 And still other courts in-
sisted on the satisfaction of relevant factors from the 1982 Senate report.
39
 These 
included a legacy of discrimination, socioeconomic differences between minority 
and nonminority citizens, and racialized campaigns for office.
40
 
There were few section 2 vote denial cases from the 1980s through the 2000s 
because vote denial itself was not very common in this period. Since 2010, 
 
34. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30. 
35. Id. 
36. For a longer discussion of these cases, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 4, at 107-09. They likely 
failed to produce consensus because of their scarcity; there was simply too little judicial activ-
ity. 
37. See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 
310 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]here must be some causal connection between the challenged electoral 
practice and the alleged discrimination . . . .”); Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 
1359 (4th Cir. 1989) (“The evidence cast considerable doubt on the existence of a causal link 
between the appointive system and Black underrepresentation in Buckingham and Halifax 
counties.”). 
38. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (endorsing “a broad, 
functionally-focused review of the evidence to determine whether a challenged voting practice 
interacts with surrounding racial discrimination in a meaningful way”); Wesley v. Collins, 
791 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1986). 
39. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (listing “a variety of factors” relevant to “establish[ing] a viola-
tion” of section 2). 
40. See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1227 n.26 (11th Cir. 2005); Roberts v. 
Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1530 (E.D. Mo. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 
1989); Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1263 (N.D. Miss. 
1987) (“[T]he same language and analysis is applicable to this voter registration case and each 
of the relevant [Senate] factors is addressed separately . . . .”). 
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though, twenty-three states have implemented new franchise restrictions.
41
 Thir-
teen have required identification for voting; eleven have limited voter registra-
tion; seven have reduced the timespan available for early voting; and three have 
delayed the restoration of voting rights for people with criminal convictions.
42
 
These measures amount to the most systematic retrenchment of the right to vote 
since the civil rights era. In geographic coverage, indeed, they surpass the fran-
chise restrictions of Jim Crow, since they are in effect nationwide, not confined 
to the South. 
This resurgence of vote denial has sparked a sharp rise in section 2 vote denial 
litigation. Unlike their pre-2010 predecessors, though, courts deciding the recent 
wave of cases have managed to agree on the applicable legal standard.
43
 The 
Sixth Circuit was the first mover, in a 2014 opinion about Ohio’s cutback to early 
voting.
44
 The court “read the text of Section 2 and the limited relevant case law 
as requiring proof of two elements for a vote denial claim.”
45
 First, the chal-
lenged practice “must impose a discriminatory burden on members of a pro-
tected class, meaning that members of the protected class ‘have less opportunity 
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process.’”
46
 
Second, “that burden must in part be caused by or linked to ‘social and historical 




The Seventh Circuit followed closely on the Sixth Circuit’s heels in a 2014 
case involving Wisconsin’s photo ID requirement for voting.
48
 The court 
“agree[d] . . . that a Section 2 vote-denial claim consists of two elements,” 
 
41. See New Voting Restrictions, supra note 1. The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. 
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), is one reason for this surge in vote denial. After Shelby County, 
formerly covered jurisdictions no longer need to preclear franchise restrictions before imple-
menting them. Another driver is the large number of states in recent years where Republicans 
have enjoyed full control of the state government. Scholars have found that franchise re-
strictions are far more likely to be enacted by Republican administrations than by Democratic 
ones. See, e.g., Keith Gunnar Bentele & Erin E. O’Brien, Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and 
Adopt Restrictive Voter Access Policies, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 1088, 1089 (2013). 
42. See New Voting Restrictions, supra note 1. 
43. I only discuss appellate decisions here. Sections I.C and I.D address both appellate and trial 
court decisions. For other scholars noting the emerging judicial consensus, see Ho, supra note 
6, at 808; Karlan, supra note 8, at 767; and Tokaji, supra note 30, at 455. 
44. See Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 531-32 (6th Cir. 2014), va-
cated as moot, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014). 
45. Id. at 554. 
46. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b) (2012), now codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018)). 
47. Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)). 
48. See Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 746 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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though it cautioned that the second step “does not distinguish discrimination by 
the defendants from other persons’ discrimination.”
49
 Next in line was the 
Fourth Circuit, in a 2014 decision regarding a North Carolina law that (among 
other things) required a photo ID to vote, curbed early voting, and eliminated 
same-day voter registration.
50
 In addition to endorsing the same two-pronged 
standard, the court emphasized the relevance of the Senate factors (the nonex-




Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit joined the emerging consensus in a 2016 
case about Texas’s photo ID requirement.
52
 It too “adopt[ed] the two-part 
framework” and “conclude[d] that the [Senate] factors should be used to help 
determine whether there is a sufficient causal link between the disparate burden 
imposed and social and historical conditions produced by discrimination.”
53
 Last 
to come on board (so far) was the Ninth Circuit, in a 2016 en banc decision ad-
dressing an Arizona law that banned almost anyone other than voters themselves 
from returning their early ballots.
54
 Like its peers, the court “agree[d] with this 
two-part framework, which is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, our 
own precedent, and with the text of § 2.”
55
 
A few points about this test are worth stressing at this juncture. First, it 
builds on the pre-2010 case law about section 2 vote denial claims
56
—but in a 
rather odd way. Instead of selecting one of the earlier approaches, the test essen-
tially embraces them all. The causation of a racial disparity is thus an important 
part of the inquiry, but so is a measure’s interaction with social and historical 
discrimination, and so too are the various Senate factors. Second, while the test 
does not explicitly refer to a jurisdiction’s justification for a challenged practice, 
one of the Senate factors does bear on this issue. This factor asks “whether the 
policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of [the practice] is ten-
uous.”
57
 A tenuous policy is tantamount to a weak justification and cuts in favor 
of liability. 
 
49. Id. at 754-55. 
50. See League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2014). 
51. Id. at 240. 
52. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 225-27 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
53. Id. at 244-45. 
54. See Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366, 371-73 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
55. Id. at 379. 
56. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
57. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982). 
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Third, of the remaining Senate factors, only a few are relevant to vote denial 
(as opposed to vote dilution) claims. They are “the extent of any history of offi-
cial discrimination” with respect to voting, “the extent to which members of the 
minority group . . . bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, 
employment and health,” and “whether political campaigns have been charac-
terized by overt or subtle racial appeals.”
58
 These factors illuminate the social 
and historical discrimination with which a measure must interact to produce its 
disparate impact. Last, and most pertinent here, the emerging consensus about 
the test’s form masks a number of fierce disagreements about its application. I 
turn to these areas of dispute later in this Part.
59
 They mean that section 2 vote 
denial law is much more unsettled than its placid surface suggests. 
B. The Academy’s Approval 
Before diving into these turbulent waters, though, I note one more zone of 
relative harmony: the legal academy. Before the courts of appeals began to em-
brace their two-part test in 2014, several scholars recommended close to the same 
inquiry. In a 2001 article, Stephen Pershing emphasized both the “causal link 
that . . . transmits to the voting process the racially disparate effect of some other 
social inequality” and the “idea that the Senate Report totality factors [should] 
be applied in every section 2 case.”
60
 In a 2006 piece, Paul Moke and Richard 
Saphire called attention to “the interaction between racial disparities in econom-
ics, employment, and education and [the challenged policy] that yields an ina-
bility to participate in the franchise.”
61
 And in 2013, Janai Nelson argued that 
courts should “examine the historical racial context of discrimination” in order 
to “determine whether persistent racial inequality interacts with [disputed] laws 
to cause disparate vote denial.”
62
 All of these commentators should feel vindi-




58. Id. at 28-29. These are the factors that most explicitly address discrimination in all its guises. 
See also Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 595-
97 (2013) (highlighting the Senate factors relating to discrimination). 
59. See infra Section I.C. 
60. Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An Equal Access Theory for Inter-
esting Times, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1193-94 (2001). 
61. Paul Moke & Richard B. Saphire, The Voting Rights Act and the Racial Gap in Lost Votes, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 24 (2006). 
62. Nelson, supra note 58, at 597. 
63. So should Dan Tokaji, who urged in 2006 that “a plaintiff . . . be required to show . . . that 
this disparate impact is traceable to the challenged practice’s interaction with social and his-
torical conditions,” Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the 
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Since courts arrived at their approach, too, the academic reception has been 
highly positive. Voting rights litigator Dale Ho, who has tried several key VRA 
cases, has written that “the new two-part test for vote denial liability under Sec-





 Issacharoff and Karlan have each praised the test, describing 
it as a “breakthrough”
66
 that promotes “full civic inclusion for long-excluded 
minority citizens.”
67
 They have also contended that “whether the policy under-
lying the challenged practice is ‘tenuous’ [should] play[] a more central role” in 
the analysis.
68
 Dan Tokaji has taken an analogous position, labeling the test’s 
two prongs “a significant improvement” over prior doctrine, and urging that 
they be supplemented by a third element that would “balance the harm to mi-
nority voters against the state’s proffered interests.”
69
 
I share Issacharoff, Karlan, and Tokaji’s view that courts should more care-
fully scrutinize the justifications for the racial disparities caused by electoral prac-
tices. But my perspective otherwise diverges from the academic conventional 
wisdom.
70
 As I explain below,
71
 I do not agree that a measure’s interaction with 
social and historical discrimination should be a distinct legal requirement. Nor 
do I think the Senate factors deserve the pride of place that has been given to 
them. Even as to justifications, their evaluation should be a separate part of the 
inquiry, I believe, not an embellishment of a Senate factor or an open-ended bal-
ancing exercise. My stances, I hasten to add, are not simply my personal prefer-
ences. Rather, they follow from my commitment to unifying disparate impact 
law—to treating section 2 as a subfield of a larger legal domain, not as its own 
secluded fiefdom. Taking this project seriously means rethinking the judicial 
standard for vote denial claims, not just tinkering at its edges. 
 
Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 724 (2006), and Dale Ho, who identified this approach 
as an option in 2014, see Ho, supra note 5, at 695-96. I flag Tokaji’s and Ho’s more recent work 
in the next paragraph. 
64. Ho, supra note 6, at 823. 
65. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
66. Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 317. 
67. Karlan, supra note 8, at 789. 
68. Id. at 768; see also Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 316 (“[I]n the emerging voting-rights cases, 
tenuousness becomes the statutory hook for shifting the inquiry onto the state’s justification 
for the proposed reform of electoral practices.”). 
69. Tokaji, supra note 30, at 441. 
70. I note, though, that several other scholars have observed (but not pursued) the analogy be-
tween Title VII and section 2 vote denial claims. See Ho, supra note 5, at 687; Nelson, supra 
note 58, at 587; Tokaji, supra note 63, at 692. 
71. See infra Part II. 
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C. Unanswered Questions 
But why unify disparate impact law? Why disrupt a status quo that com-
mands general assent from courts and scholars alike? I present the affirmative 
case for unification (and disruption) in Part II. First, though, in this Section and 
the next, I highlight the problems with the doctrine as it currently stands. One 
glaring issue is that, to date, the case law has failed to answer basic questions 
about the operation of the test for section 2 vote denial claims. These questions 
have arisen—repeatedly—in recent suits. But in engaging with them, courts have 
taken sharply different tacks and no resolution seems forthcoming. 
Moreover, at least some of the blame for the discord may be attributable to 
courts’ insistence on analyzing section 2 in isolation, without reference to the rest 
of disparate impact law. As I explain later, under Title VII, the FHA, and other 
statutes, reasonable answers exist to the questions that have stymied the judici-
ary under section 2.
72
 Yet these solutions have been overlooked by courts decid-
ing vote denial cases. Instead, they have marched alone into the fray, indifferent 
to the doctrinal progress their peers have made in adjacent areas. Confusion and 
conflict have been the predictable results. 
1. Specific Practice or Entire System? 
To start, what exactly is a section 2 vote denial plaintiff supposed to chal-
lenge—a particular electoral practice or a jurisdiction’s integrated system of elec-
tion administration? Some courts have individually examined a series of 
measures, making factual findings and reaching legal conclusions as to each dis-
crete policy. A North Carolina district court, for example, “considered each chal-
lenged electoral mechanism only separately” when confronted with an omnibus 
law that regulated voter identification, early voting, same-day voter registration, 
and several more subjects.
73
 The Sixth Circuit did the same in a dispute over 
Ohio provisions that tightened the identification requirements for absentee bal-
lots, shortened the period for fixing absentee-ballot mistakes, and limited poll-
worker assistance for needy voters.
74
 As the dissent put it, the court “engage[d] 
 
72. See infra Section II.C. 
73. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (de-
scribing the district court’s approach). 
74. See Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 2016). 
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in a piecemeal freeze frame approach . . . finding that each new requirement 
alone in a vacuum does not meet the standard for disparate impact.”
75
 
Other courts, however, have evaluated the collective result of all the disputed 
practices. Assessing the same North Carolina omnibus law, for instance, the 
Fourth Circuit “consider[ed] the sum of those parts and their cumulative effect 
on minority access to the ballot box.”
76
 Together, “the panoply of restrictions 
results in greater disenfranchisement than any of the law’s provisions individu-
ally.”
77
 Similarly, in a case about Wisconsin’s photo ID requirement, the Seventh 
Circuit held that it “must look not at [this requirement] in isolation but to the 
entire voting and registration system.”
78
 Because “blacks do not seem to be dis-




2. Does the Size of the Disparity Matter? 
Next, whether one policy or many are at issue, does the disparate racial im-
pact have to reach a certain magnitude before section 2 is violated? An Alabama 
district court said yes in a case involving a photo ID requirement, in which the 
plaintiffs’ expert estimated that only 1.4%, 2.4%, and 2.3% of white, black, and 
Hispanic registered voters, respectively, lacked valid documents.
80
 The court 
thought this “discrepancy in photo ID possession rates” was “miniscule,” and 
thus held that “the law has no discriminatory impact.”
81
 A North Carolina dis-
trict court followed the same logic in analyzing a ban on counting provisional 
ballots cast in the wrong precinct.
82
 About 0.2% of white voters’ ballots and 0.3% 
 
75. Id. at 658 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also, e.g., One Wis. Inst. v. 
Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 954-57 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (separately analyzing five Wisconsin 
policies); Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, 189 F. Supp. 3d 708, 758-59 (S.D. Ohio 2016) 
(separately analyzing five Ohio policies), rev’d, 834 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2016). 
76. League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 242. 
77. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 231 (4th Cir. 2016). 
78. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014). 
79. Id.; see also, e.g., Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 628 (6th Cir. 2016) (treating 
an Ohio cutback to early voting as “one component of Ohio’s progressive voting system” and 
emphasizing the “many options that remain available to Ohio voters”). 
80. Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1269 (N.D. Ala. 2018). 
81. Id. at 1274, 1277. 
82. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 366 (M.D.N.C.), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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of black voters’ ballots are cast in an incorrect place—a difference that was “min-
imal,” in the court’s view, and would “not result in unequal access to the polls.”
83
 
Not so, retorted the Fourth Circuit on appeal. “[T]he basic truth [is] that 
even one disenfranchised voter—let alone several thousand—is too many.”
84
 
“[W]hat matters for purposes of Section 2 is not how many minority voters are 
being denied equal electoral opportunities but simply that ‘any’ minority voter 
is being denied . . . .”
85
 Justice Scalia also suggested that the scale of a racial dis-
parity is immaterial in a vote denial hypothetical he posed in a vote dilution case. 
If “a county permitted voter registration for only three hours one day a week, 
and that made it more difficult for blacks to register than whites . . . § 2 would 
therefore be violated—even if the number of potential black voters 
was . . . small.”
86
 
3. Ability to Comply or Effect on Turnout? 
Third, how should a racial difference be measured—in terms of minority and 
nonminority citizens’ abilities to comply with a provision, or based on its ulti-
mate effect on voter turnout? In a case about Texas’s photo ID requirement, the 
Fifth Circuit “decline[d] to require a showing of lower turnout to prove a Section 
2 violation.”
87
 The court explained that “[a]n election law may keep some voters 
from going to the polls,” yet “turnout by different voters might increase for some 
other reason.”
88
 The Fourth Circuit took the same position when African Amer-
ican turnout grew slightly after the North Carolina omnibus law was imple-
mented for one election.
89
 According to the court, this rise was “beyond the scope 
of disproportionate impact analysis” and did not change the reality that “many 




83. Id. at 367; see also, e.g., Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 628 (6th Cir. 
2016) (“A law cannot disparately impact minority voters if its impact is insignificant to begin 
with.”). 
84. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 244 (4th Cir. 2014). 
85. Id. 
86. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 408 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
87. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 260 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
88. Id. 
89. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 232 (4th Cir. 2016). 
90. Id.; see also, e.g., One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2016) 
(“[R]aw turnout statistics reveal very little about the disparate burdens that a state’s election 
system imposes.”); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, No. 2:06-CV-896, 2016 WL 
3166251, at *51 (S.D. Ohio June 7, 2016) (“Registration and turnout numbers . . . do not tell 
the entire story of a group’s access to the polls.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 837 F.3d 612 
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In contrast, a dissenting Fifth Circuit judge argued against section 2 liability 
unless there was “a link between requiring [photo] IDs for voting and dimin-
ished turnout.”
91
 In the absence of “evidence in the record that anybody was ac-
tually prevented from voting,” a vote denial claim should fail.
92
 Likewise, the 
Seventh Circuit sustained Wisconsin’s photo ID requirement in part because it 
was unclear “what happened to voter turnout . . . when [the measure] was en-
forced.”
93
 The court also wanted to know: “Did the requirement of photo ID 
reduce the number of voters below what otherwise would have been ex-
pected?”
94
 “Did that effect differ by race or ethnicity?”
95
 And “what has hap-




4. Is Interaction with Discrimination Necessary? 
Fourth, must a policy’s disparate racial impact be linked to its interaction 
with social and historical discrimination? As discussed above, the emerging ju-
dicial consensus insists on such a connection.
97
 It also regards the Senate factors 
as instructive evidence of the discrimination with which a policy must interact.
98
 
But here too there are skeptical voices. The Seventh Circuit, for example, refused 
to consider private (as opposed to public) discrimination as well as any socio-
economic differences it may have caused. “[U]nits of government are responsi-
ble for their own discrimination but not for rectifying the effects of other per-
sons’ discrimination.”
99
 Section 2 thus “does not require states to overcome so-
 
(6th Cir. 2016). For scholars also endorsing this position, see Ho, supra note 6, at 809-15; 
Karlan, supra note 8, at 768-77; and Tokaji, supra note 30, at 474-76. 
91. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 308 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
92. Id. at 314. 
93. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 2014). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id.; see also, e.g., Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 639 (6th Cir. 2016) (uphold-
ing Ohio’s cutback to early voting in part because “African Americans’ participation was at 
least equal to that of white voters”); N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. 
Supp. 3d 320, 424 (M.D.N.C.) (“[W]hen courts have found § 2 violations, they have fre-
quently grounded that decision in part on lagging minority turnout and registration rates.”), 
rev’d, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016). 
97. See supra Section I.A. 
98. See id. 
99. Frank, 768 F.3d at 753. 
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A Wisconsin district court also deemed the Senate factors inapplicable. It 
observed that they “play a central role in vote-dilution cases,” where they “assist 
courts in resolving the tension” between promoting minority representation on 
the one hand and avoiding a guarantee of proportional representation on the 
other.
101
 However, “[f]actors developed for this purpose are not necessarily rel-
evant to cases, like this one, that do not present that tension.”
102
 Interestingly, 
the court could point to impeccable legal authority matching its conclusion about 
the Senate factors’ inaptness. The Senate report itself declared that vote denial 
cases “would not necessarily involve the same factors as the courts have utilized 
when dealing with” vote dilution.
103
 
5. Are Minority Preferences a Defense? 
Fifth, is it exculpatory if a racial disparity can be ascribed to minority citizens’ 
subjective preferences (and thus not to a practice’s interaction with social and 
historical discrimination)? The Third Circuit thought so in a case involving a 
Pennsylvania law that purged registered voters from the rolls if they failed to 
vote for two years.
104
 Minority citizens harmed by the provision, the court rea-
soned, “have registered to vote at least once, if not more often.”
105
 “Had they 
continued to do so,” instead of choosing not to vote or register, “the purge law 
could not have affected them.”
106
 A North Carolina district court dismissed evi-
dence that minority citizens are more likely than nonminority citizens to use 
 
100. Id.; see also, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 306 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Jones, J., dis-
senting) (approvingly citing these passages); Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1125 
(9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (objecting to the 
view that section 2 liability attaches simply because “a disparate impact in an area external to 
voting . . . translates into a disparate impact on voting”). 
101. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 869 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). 
102. Id. 
103. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 (1982); see also, e.g., N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 
182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 414 (M.D.N.C.) (“These [Senate] factors are drawn from the vote dilution 
context, where they have more obvious application.”), rev’d, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016). 
104. See Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 307 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
105. Id. at 315. 
106. Id. 
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same-day voter registration on the same basis.
107
 “That voters preferred to use 




On appeal, the Fourth Circuit again vehemently disagreed. “No mere ‘pref-
erence’ led African Americans to disproportionately use early voting, same-day 
registration, out-of-precinct voting, and preregistration.”
109
 “Registration and 
voting tools may be a simple ‘preference’ for many white North Carolinians, but 
for many African Americans, they are a necessity.”
110
 The Sixth Circuit also 
found it immaterial that black voters’ greater use of straight-ticket voting in 
Michigan is due to their “‘tend[ency] to vote overwhelmingly for Demo-
crats.’”
111
 While this partisan explanation made it “challenging” to say that the 
state’s elimination of straight-ticket voting “‘interacts with’ [discriminatory] 




6. How Does Tenuousness Work? 
Sixth, what is the nature of the inquiry into a policy’s tenuousness—the sole 
Senate factor relating to a jurisdiction’s justification for a practice? For most 
courts, tenuousness has been an afterthought, a brief addendum at the end of an 
opinion focused on other matters. Here, for instance, is the bulk of the Fourth 
Circuit’s analysis of tenuousness in its decision about North Carolina’s omnibus 
law: “North Carolina asserts goals of electoral integrity and fraud prevention. 
But nothing . . . suggests that those are anything other than merely imagina-
ble.”
113
 Similarly, this is the sum of what the Sixth Circuit had to say about ten-
uousness in a case about Ohio’s cutback to early voting: “Under Senate factor 
 
107. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 349 (M.D.N.C.), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 
F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014). 
108. Id. at 351. 
109. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 233 (4th Cir. 2016). 
110. Id. 
111. Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656, 668 (6th Cir. 2016). 
112. Id. 
113. League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 246; see also id. at 244 (“Section 2 does not prescribe 
a balancing test under which the State can pit its desire for administrative ease against its 
minority citizens’ right to vote.”). 
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Conversely, the Fifth Circuit carefully scrutinized the series of interests that 
Texas invoked on behalf of its photo ID requirement. These included following 
the lead of other states with such provisions, preventing voter fraud, stopping 
undocumented immigrants from voting, and bolstering voter confidence.
115
 
Even more rigorous was a North Carolina district court’s inspection of the state’s 
justifications for its omnibus law. This section of the court’s opinion ran to 
twenty-five pages (albeit out of a total of nearly two hundred) and exhaustively 
explained why each measure had a valid rationale.
116
 For these courts, tenuous-
ness was plainly no postscript; rather, its absence was effectively an element of 
the cause of action. 
7. What Is the Remedy? 
Lastly, what relief should be granted when a policy breaches section 2? Sev-
eral courts have concluded that “the proper remedy . . . is invalidation”
117
 and 
thus have permanently enjoined practices from being used in the future. A per-
manent injunction was the fate of, among others, Ohio’s cutback to early vot-
ing,
118
 North Carolina’s omnibus law,
119
 and Michigan’s ban on straight-ticket 
voting.
120
 “[A]n injunction is the only practicable remedy,” elaborated a Wiscon-
sin district court.
121
 “[S]urely it would make little sense to allow Blacks and La-
tinos to vote without” complying with a provision, “while continuing to require 




114. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 557 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated as 
moot, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014); see also, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 17 
F. Supp. 3d 837, 878 (E.D. Wis.) (“There is nothing in the text of Section 2 indicating that the 
state’s interest is relevant . . . .”), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).  
115. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 262-64 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
116. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 440-65 (M.D.N.C.), 
rev’d, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016). 
117. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 239 (adding that different relief may be appropriate when no discrimina-
tory intent is found). 
118. See Husted, 768 F.3d at 560-61. 
119. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 239-41. 
120. See Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656, 669 (6th Cir. 2016). 
121. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 879 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). 
122. Id. Also, notably, a district court recently held that its earlier invalidation of Wisconsin’s cut-
back to early voting barred the State from trying again to limit the early-voting period. See 
One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, No. 15-cv-324-jdp, 2019 WL 254093, at *2-5 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 
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No court has ordered such racially differential relief. A number of courts, 
though, have ruled that measures should be softened when they contravene sec-
tion 2—relaxed for minority and nonminority citizens alike—not struck down in 
their entirety. In a case about Wisconsin’s photo ID requirement, for example, 
the Seventh Circuit stated that courts’ “remedial authority is limited to ending 
the illegal conduct,” which “is not photo ID in the abstract, but how income and 
education affect the probability of having photo ID.”
123
 Therefore, “[t]he injunc-
tion should . . . allow[] the state an opportunity to make photo ID more readily 
available.”
124
 Likewise, in another photo ID case, the Fifth Circuit opined that 
“[s]imply reverting to the system in place before [the law’s] passage would not 
fully respect [Texas’s] policy choices.”
125
 Accordingly, “[t]he remedy must be 
tailored to rectify only the discriminatory effect on those voters who do not have 
[photo] ID or are unable to reasonably obtain such identification.”
126
 
D. Looming Concerns 
These unanswered questions, it is fair to say, are no mere tangents. On the 
contrary, they strike at the heart of the emerging test for section 2 vote denial 
claims. They mean that fundamental issues about both of the test’s prongs re-
main unresolved. They mean that courts lack concrete guidance as to matters 
that recur in almost every case. And, most relevant here, they mean that little 
deference is due to the judicial consensus in favor of the test. Superficial agree-




2019). These cases, though, should not be read as forever barring states from adopting certain 
policies. If circumstances significantly changed, presumably the enjoined measures could law-
fully be reenacted. 
123. Frank, 768 F.3d at 755. 
124. Id. Since Frank, as suggested by this passage, the district court has suggested that “the appro-
priate remedy” for “those who cannot obtain ID with reasonable effort” is “to allow those 
voters to present an affidavit in lieu of photo identification.” Frank v. Walker, 196 F. Supp. 3d 
893, 916 (E.D. Wis. 2016). 
125. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 271 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
126. Id.; see also, e.g., One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 963 (W.D. Wis. 2016) 
(holding that Wisconsin’s photo ID petition process is unlawful but “does not require whole-
sale invalidation”). 
127. Of course, there also exist unanswered questions about many other areas of law. See, e.g., 
Christopher S. Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 604-27 (2016) 
(describing outstanding issues in vote dilution doctrine). The questions about vote denial law, 
though, are unusual in their number, in their significance, and in that they have been answered 
by the broader field of disparate impact law. 
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Beyond the unanswered questions, there is a practical problem with the 
courts’ two-part test, which then leads to a legal problem. The practical problem 
is that the test is too easy to satisfy. Many aspects of states’ electoral systems 
cause racial disparities, and almost all of them are suspect under the test. The 
consequent legal problem is that if the test assigns liability this readily, then it 
puts section 2 in serious constitutional danger. It widens the gap between viola-
tions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (which require a discrimina-
tory purpose
128
) and breaches of section 2 (which take little more than a dispar-
ate impact), thus undermining section 2’s congruence and proportionality with 
the Amendments. It also encourages jurisdictions to consider race when admin-




To see why the test threatens so many practices, start with its first prong. 
Minority citizens tend to be substantially more affected than nonminority citi-
zens by a host of common regulations of voting. In states with voter registration 
(which is almost all of them
130
), minority citizens generally register at lower 
rates.
131
 In states that disenfranchise felons (again, almost all of them),
132
 mi-
nority citizens more frequently lose their right to vote.
133
 In the twelve states that 
 
128. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (Fifteenth Amendment); Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (Fourteenth Amendment). 
129. This legal problem exists no matter how the questions in Section I.C are answered. However 
those issues are resolved, the courts’ two-part test continues to lack the justification defense 
that is critical for not reaching far beyond racially discriminatory intent and not overly racial-
izing election administration. 
130. The only exception is North Dakota. See North Dakota . . . . The Only State Without Voter Reg-
istration, N.D. SECRETARY ST. (Aug. 2017), https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/portals/votereg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R2TG-9ZAU]. 
131. See Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 2017), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-580
.html [https://perma.cc/J38V-ARHU] (reporting 2016 voter registration rates of 72% for 
white citizens, 69% for black citizens, and 57% for Hispanic citizens). 
132. Only in Maine and Vermont can incarcerated felons vote. Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns
/felon-voting-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/8RZ2-KN6A]. 
133. See Erin Kelley, Racism and Felony Disenfranchisement: An Intertwined History, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST. 1 (May 19, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications
/Disenfranchisement_History.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4DB-RWCD]. I do not focus on 
felon disenfranchisement in this Article because courts have mostly concluded that, unlike 
other electoral practices, it is either wholly beyond the reach of section 2 or unlawful only if 
linked to racially discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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do not offer early voting,
134
 minority citizens would be more likely to vote before 
Election Day if this option were available.
135
 Across the country, minority citi-
zens are less apt to have driver’s licenses, and so less able to take advantage of 
motor-voter registration.
136
 Also nationwide, as a dissenting Fifth Circuit judge 
has observed, minority citizens are “disproportionately affect[ed]” by “polling 
locations,” “mail-in ballots,” “language on absentee ballots,” “the number of 
vote-counting machines a county must have,” and even “holding elections on 
Tuesday.”
137
 With respect to any of these measures, a racial disparity could be 
established without much difficulty, and a plaintiff could therefore advance to 
the test’s second prong. 
This second element—the attribution of a policy’s disparate impact to its in-
teraction with social and historical discrimination—is the one that meaningfully 
restricts the test’s reach according to backers of the emerging consensus. In the 
words of the Fifth Circuit, it is a “sufficient and familiar way to limit courts’ in-
terference . . . to [practices] that truly have a discriminatory impact.”
138
 Or as 
Ho has written, “[T]he second prong ‘limit[s] liability only to claims where a 
challenged law has a particularly burdensome racial effect.’”
139
 
Yet of all the recent section 2 vote denial decisions, only one seems to have 
found a racial disparity but then concluded that it was not the result of a meas-
ure’s interaction with discrimination. As mentioned above, a North Carolina dis-
trict court determined that black citizens are more likely to use same-day voter 
registration but that this proclivity stems from their idiosyncratic preferences.
140
 
In every other case, if a court discerned a disparate impact, it also managed to 
 
134. Absentee and Early Voting, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.ncsl
.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx [https://perma.cc
/L8A8-BNZS]. 
135. Cf. Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1254 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (stating for this reason that 
“acceptance of Plaintiffs’ argument that the eight days of early voting allowed by the Florida 
legislature violates Section 2 could have far-reaching implications”); Jacksonville Coal. for 
Voter Prot. v. Hood, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335-36 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (similar). 
136. See Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592, 601 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[M]otor-voter regis-
tration would be found to be invalid as members of the protected class were less likely to 
possess a driver’s license.”); Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 754 (7th Cir. 2014). 
137. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 310 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting). 
138. Id. at 247 (majority opinion). 
139. Ho, supra note 6, at 804 (quoting Ho, supra note 5, at 703); see also, e.g., Karlan, supra note 8, 
at 767 (arguing that the second prong, which is a critical part of the totality of the circum-
stances, prevents the test from “render[ing] virtually every electoral rule vulnerable”). 
140. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 351 (M.D.N.C.), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 
F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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link that impact to past and present discrimination, as illuminated by the Senate 
factors.
141
 In every other case, that is, the probability of the test’s second prong 
being satisfied, conditional on its first prong having been met, was one hundred 
percent. (And even in the North Carolina litigation, the district court’s decision 
was eventually reversed on appeal, precisely because it was interaction with dis-




The elements’ near-perfect correlation should not be surprising. When an 
electoral policy causes a racial disparity, it almost never does so at random—be-
cause a condition for voting just happens to be associated with race. Rather, the 
causal chain connecting the policy with the disparity almost always includes a 
role for social and historical discrimination. Discrimination helps explain minor-
ity citizens’ worse education, higher poverty, and greater residential isolation. 
These socioeconomic disadvantages, in turn, help explain why minority citizens 
are less likely to register to vote, to have photo IDs, to vote on Election Day, and 
so on. To put the point another way: discrimination is generally a reason why 
minority citizens participate in the political process at lower rates. But precisely 
because it is generally a reason, requiring it to be shown adds little to requiring 
proof of a disparate impact alone. The impact’s causal mechanism is present 
about as often as the impact itself.
143
 
Now turn from the operation of the courts’ test to its validity. From a consti-
tutional perspective, two concerns arise if the test’s nominally separate prongs in 
fact collapse into a single inquiry.
144
 First, section 2 may then exceed Congress’s 
 
141. See, e.g., Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656, 668-69 (6th Cir. 
2016); Veasey, 830 F.3d at 256-64; League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 245-47; Ohio 
State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 556-57 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated as 
moot, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. 2014); One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F. 
Supp. 3d 896, 957-60 (W.D. Wis. 2016); N.E. Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted, 
No. 2:06-CV-896, 2016 WL 3166251, at *49-53 (S.D. Ohio June 7, 2016), aff’d in part and rev’d 
in part, 837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016); Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, 189 F. Supp. 3d 708, 
759-62 (S.D. Ohio), rev’d, 834 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2016); Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 
877-79 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). This sample size is not enormous 
(amounting to just eight decisions), but it is still quite suggestive of the second prong’s lim-
ited independent value. 
142. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 233 (4th Cir. 2016). 
143. For another scholar making this point (albeit in the constitutional context), see Michael J. 
Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 558 
(1977) (“Laws having a disproportionate racial impact burden blacks because of their especially 
disadvantaged position in American society.”). 
144. To be clear, these concerns would only threaten section 2 itself (as opposed to the two-part 
test enforcing it) if section 2 necessarily required the test to be used. I explain below why 
neither section 2’s text nor the cases construing the provision compels the test’s use. See infra 
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enforcement powers under the Reconstruction Amendments.
145
 Under these 
Amendments, according to the Supreme Court, there must be “congruence and 
proportionality” between Congress’s chosen means and the “injury to be pre-
vented or remedied.”
146
 And in the Court’s view, the only harm to be avoided or 
cured in this area is intentional racial discrimination.
147
 The test may thus be 
noncongruent and disproportionate because it prohibits a broad swath of con-
duct that is constitutionally innocuous: governmental activity that lacks a dis-
criminatory purpose but produces a disparate impact. As a dissenting former 
Ninth Circuit judge has argued, the test “destroys section 2’s congruence and 
proportionality” if it is breached by “nothing but [racial] disparities.”
148
 
Second, if that is all it takes to infringe section 2, then jurisdictions may have 
to take race into account whenever they change (or maintain) their electoral reg-
ulations. They may have to analyze each potential (or existing) law’s racial ef-
fects, and depending on what they find, they may even have to adopt race-based 
policies in order to avoid liability. But in a pivotal 2015 case, Texas Department of 
Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, the Supreme Court 
warned that if a statute “cause[s] race to be used and considered in a pervasive 
way,” “serious constitutional questions then could arise” under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
149
 The statute could offend the equal protection principle of 
 
Section III.A. Thus, if these constitutional arguments were accepted, their implication would 
be not the invalidation of section 2 but rather judicial insistence that some other standard 
(presumably more like the usual framework) be deployed instead to determine vote denial 
liability. Cf. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (construing section 2 narrowly in the 
vote dilution context in order to “avoid[] serious constitutional questions”). 
145. Under the Elections Clause, on the other hand, there is no reason why Congress could not 
enact a pure disparate impact provision. See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 
570 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013) (discussing Congress’s near-plenary authority under Article I, Section 
4 of the Constitution). But the Elections Clause applies only to congressional elections, and 
thus cannot rescue section 2 with respect to elections at any other level. See U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 4, cl. 1. 
146. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). Strictly speaking, City of Boerne dealt only 
with the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving the Fifteenth Amendment standard undetermined. 
See also Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009) (declining again to 
specify the Fifteenth Amendment test). 
147. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
148. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). City of Boerne itself involved this same combination of essentially 
a pure effects test and a constitutional provision requiring discriminatory intent. See 521 U.S. 
at 529-36. So did Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-91 (2000). There is thus 
ample precedent for the proposition that naked disparate impact laws are not congruent and 
proportional responses to constitutional violations based on invidious motives. 
149. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015); see also id. at 2522 (noting “the serious constitutional questions 
that might arise . . . if such liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical 
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colorblindness by, as Justice Scalia put it on a different occasion, “plac[ing] a 
racial thumb on the scales” and “requiring [jurisdictions] to evaluate the racial 
outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those 
racial outcomes.”
150
 Echoing these sentiments, a Fifth Circuit dissenter criticized 
the courts’ test precisely because of the excessive race consciousness it allegedly 
induces. The test, she claimed, “will force considerations of race on state law-
makers who will endeavor to avoid litigation by eliminating any perceived racial 
disparity in voting regulations.”
151
 
Of course, these constitutional objections are not universally shared. Numer-
ous observers (myself included) think it is perfectly permissible, if not neces-
sarily advisable, for Congress to ban electoral practices solely because of the racial 
discrepancies they cause.
152
 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s contrary position 
is the law of the land. It therefore behooves supporters of section 2 to think of 
ways to restrict its reach—to prevent it from imposing liability in almost all cir-
cumstances where policies produce disparate impacts. The next Part turns to that 
project, on which the continuing viability of the VRA’s most important remain-




disparity”). This concern has also been raised in section 2 vote dilution cases. See, e.g., League 
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 446 (2006) (criticizing approaches that 
“would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting, raising serious constitu-
tional questions”). 
150. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
151. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 317 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting). 
152. For an example of a court defending section 2’s constitutionality, see id. at 253 (majority opin-
ion). For an example of a scholar doing the same, see Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and 
Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1998). 
The reason why a pure disparate impact provision may be imprudent, even if lawful, is that it 
prioritizes the avoidance of racial disparities above other legitimate governmental goals. See 
infra Part II. 
153. As noted earlier, see supra note 3, the VRA’s other key provision, section 5, was effectively 
nullified in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Shelby County also makes clear that 
the constitutional threat to section 2 is far from speculative. Indeed, the Court’s decision 
pointedly referred to section 2’s “permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in vot-
ing” without affirming the provision’s validity. Id. at 2631. Moreover, while section 5 was re-
peatedly upheld prior to Shelby County, the Court has never found section 2 to be constitu-
tional—not even in a vote dilution case. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has “assum[ed] but never directly ad-
dress[ed] its constitutionality”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (identifying the open “question whether § 2 . . . is consistent with the require-
ments of the United States Constitution”). 
disparate impact, unified law 
1595 
i i .  unifying disparate impact law 
In principle, there are several ways in which section 2’s scope could be nar-
rowed.
154
 But in practice, only one approach has been used by American anti-
discrimination law to cabin disparate impact liability: what I call the usual dis-
parate impact framework, or the usual framework for short. Under the usual frame-
work (as under the courts’ two-part test for section 2 vote denial claims), the 
plaintiff must prove that a practice causes a racial disparity. But next under the 
usual framework (unlike under the two-part test), the defendant has the oppor-
tunity to show that the practice is necessary to achieve a substantial interest. And 
then under the usual framework (again unlike under the two-part test), the 
plaintiff may try to demonstrate that this interest could be attained through dif-
ferent means that yield smaller racial differences. 
In this Part, I first present the usual framework, emphasizing its use in every 
area of disparate impact law other than voting. Next, I contend that the usual 
framework is fully applicable to the electoral context. Historically, theoretically, 
and substantively, the usual framework fits voting as well as—perhaps better 
than—any other field. Lastly, I return to the unanswered questions and looming 
concerns I previously identified with respect to the emerging section 2 consen-
sus. The usual framework, I maintain, responds effectively to the questions by 
drawing on decades of judicial experience. It also resolves the concerns by limit-
ing section 2 to unwarranted racial disparities. 
It is important to note, too, that my argument is not an all-or-nothing prop-
osition. It is quite possible for vote denial law to adopt some of the usual frame-
work while declining to embrace other components. To be sure, complete unifi-
cation is more doctrinally elegant, and applies to section 2 more of the hard-won 
lessons of other domains. But partial unification is more doctrinally realistic—
given the amount of precedent that has already accumulated—and still brings to 
section 2 much external wisdom. The perfect thus need not be the enemy of the 
good here. The weak form of my thesis is a perfectly viable (if not, in my view, 
equally beneficial) alternative to the strong version. 
 
154. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus Structured Decision Pro-
cedures, 132 HARV. L. REV. 992 (2019) (arguing for the balancing of racial disparities against 
defendants’ countervailing interests in place of the usual framework’s multistep approach). 
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A. The Usual Framework 
The concept of disparate impact discrimination first entered American law 
in the breakthrough 1971 case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
155
 The Supreme Court 
confronted a pair of hiring requirements—possession of a high-school diploma 
and a satisfactory score on an aptitude test—that were not adopted with a “racial 
purpose or invidious intent” but that did “render ineligible a markedly dispro-
portionate number of Negroes.”
156
 The Court held that such criteria violate Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act unless they are “shown to be related to job perfor-
mance” or to “business necessity.”
157
 The Court explained that “Congress di-
rected the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not 
simply the motivation.”
158
 Title VII thus compels the “removal of artificial, arbi-
trary, and unnecessary barriers to employment”—an end to policies that “operate 




As these quotes from Griggs illustrate, the Court meant from the outset to 
confine Title VII to racial disparities that could not be justified by employers. 
This aim was formalized in the Court’s next encounter with the disparate impact 
theory: the 1975 case of Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.
160
 The Court ruled that 
“the complaining party or class” must first “ma[k]e out a prima facie case of 
discrimination” by showing that “the tests in question select applicants for hire 
or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of 
applicants.”
161
 If a prima facie case is established, the “burden” then shifts to the 
employer to “prov[e] that its tests are ‘job related.’”
162
 The employer prevails if 
 
155. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In an interesting twist, one of the only precedents on which the Court 
relied in Griggs, see id. at 430, was an early vote denial case, Gaston County v. United States, 395 
U.S. 285 (1969), where the Court struck down a literacy test not because it was enacted with 
discriminatory intent but, rather, because it extended educational inequality to the voting do-
main. See 395 U.S. at 297 (“‘Impartial’ administration of the literacy test today would serve 
only to perpetuate these inequities in a different form.”). 
156. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429. 
157. Id. at 431; see also id. at 432 (“[A]ny given requirement must have a manifest relationship to 
the employment in question.”). 
158. Id. at 432. 
159. Id. at 431, 432. 
160. 422 U.S. 405 (1975); see also CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 35 (1980) (observing that Albemarle set forth the disparate impact 
framework “in terms of the process of litigation, with plaintiff’s surrebuttal element a new 
step in the structure”). 
161. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425. 
162. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)). 
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it demonstrates job relatedness unless “the complaining party [can] show that 
other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, 
would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest.”
163
 
In the decades following Albemarle, the Court repeatedly refined the case’s 
three-step approach. I discuss some of these doctrinal developments later in this 
Part.
164
 For a period in the late 1980s, the Court also veered closer to reversal 
than to refinement. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, in particular, the Court 
diluted the justification inquiry to merely “whether a challenged practice 
serves . . . the legitimate employment goals of the employer.”
165
 The Court 
switched the burden allocation between the parties as well, such that “[t]he bur-




In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, Congress emphatically rejected 
these aspects of Wards Cove and restored the usual framework.
167
 Under the Act 
(as under Albemarle), “a complaining party [must] demonstrate[] that a re-
spondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate im-
pact.”
168
 If this showing is made, the respondent may try to “demonstrate that 
the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent 
with business necessity.”
169
 If this showing is made too, the complaining party 
may offer an “alternative employment practice” that is similarly job related and 
consistent with business necessity, but that produces a smaller racial disparity.
170
 
Congress has never revisited this language, so it remains the operative standard 
for disparate impact liability under Title VII. 
In fact, it remains much more than that. Title VII’s burden-shifting approach 
has served as the template for how disparate impact liability is determined in 
every other area (except voting) that recognizes the theory. Consider the Fair 
 
163. Id. 
164. See infra Section II.C. 
165. 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). The decision then notes that “[t]he touchstone of this inquiry is a 
reasoned review of the employer’s justification for his use of the challenged practice.” Id. 
166. Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1988) (plurality opinion)). 
167. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2018). For a helpful piece on 
the Act’s enactment, written by some of the key players in the drama, see Peter M. Leibold et 
al., Civil Rights Act of 1991: Race to the Finish—Civil Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in 
1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1043 (1993). 
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 




 After decades in which many courts of appeals chose to employ 
the usual framework,
172
 the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) ratified their decisions in a 2013 regulation.
173
 Under the HUD rule, “the 
plaintiff . . . has the burden of proving that the challenged practice caused or pre-
dictably will cause a discriminatory effect.”
174
 Next, the “defendant has the bur-
den of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more 
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.”
175
 Finally, the “plaintiff 
may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory interests . . . could be served by another practice that has a less discrimina-
tory effect.”
176
 “[T]his burden-shifting scheme,” HUD pointed out in an accom-
panying statement, “is consistent with the Title VII discriminatory effects 
standard codified by Congress in 1991.”
177
 
The Supreme Court considered the HUD rule in Inclusive Communities, the 
2015 case about whether the FHA authorizes disparate impact claims.
178
 The 
Court not only held that the FHA does so; it also endorsed the usual framework 
(as articulated in the HUD rule) while explicitly linking the FHA to Title VII. 
“The cases interpreting Title VII . . . provide essential background and instruc-
tion,” the Court declared.
179
 “These cases . . . teach that disparate-impact liabil-
ity must be limited so employers and other regulated entities are able to make 
the practical business choices . . . that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-enter-
prise system.”
180
 The Title VII precedents also establish that “before rejecting a 
business justification—or, in the case of a governmental entity, an analogous 
 
171. The relevant statutory provisions are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3605(a). 
172. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11460, 11462 (Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter FHA Implementation] (codified largely at 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.500 (2018)) (noting that “HUD has always used a three-step burden-shifting approach, 
as do many federal courts of appeals”). 
173. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500. More recently, HUD has asked for comments as to whether this reg-
ulation should be revisited in light of Inclusive Communities. See Reconsideration of HUD’s 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 83 Fed. Reg. 28560 
(June 20, 2018). 
174. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1). 
175. Id. § 100.500(c)(2). 
176. Id. § 100.500(c)(3). 
177. FHA Implementation, supra note 172, at 11474. 
178. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015); 
see also id. at 2514-15, 2522-23 (citing the HUD rule approvingly). 
179. Id. at 2518. 
180. Id.; see also id. at 2522 (noting that this justification inquiry “is analogous to the business ne-
cessity standard under Title VII”). 
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public interest—a court must determine that a plaintiff has shown that there is” 
a less discriminatory alternative.
181
 “[T]he Title VII framework may not transfer 




Or take Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, enacted at the same time as 
Title VII and prohibiting recipients of federal funds from engaging in racial dis-
crimination.
183
 Title VI itself bars only intentional discrimination,
184
 but agen-
cies implementing the provision “may validly proscribe activities that have a dis-
parate impact on racial groups.”
185
 Pursuant to this authority, twenty-six 
agencies have issued disparate impact regulations.
186
 Virtually all of these rules, 
according to the Department of Justice’s Title VI Legal Manual, have adopted 
the usual framework: 
First, does the adverse effect of the policy or practice disproportionately 
affect members of a group identified by race[?] . . . If so, can the recipient 
demonstrate the existence of a substantial legitimate justification for the 
policy or practice? . . . Finally, is there an alternative that would achieve 
the same legitimate objective but with less of a discriminatory effect?
187
 
These “elements of a Title VI disparate impact claim,” the Manual adds, “are 




The usual framework is also employed under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA).
189
 As the Supreme Court has held, “employment crite-
ria” that cause an “adverse impact on older workers as a group” are unlawful 
 
181. Id. at 2518. 
182. Id. at 2523. 
183. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d (2018)). 
184. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001). 
185. Id. at 281. 
186. See Civil Rights Div., Title VI Legal Manual, U.S. DEP’T JUST. § 7, at 3 (2017), https://www 
.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/934826/download [https://perma.cc/57RX-48BH]. 
187. Id. at 6. 
188. Id.; see id. at 3 n.2 (“Cases decided under Title VII or the Fair Housing Act may be instruc-
tive.”); see also Charles F. Abernathy, Legal Realism and the Failure of the “Effects” Test for Dis-
crimination, 94 GEO. L.J. 267, 286 (2006) (noting that, even in the absence of agency guide-
lines, courts “develop[ed] Title VI’s balancing defense” by “following the Supreme Court’s 
three-step formulation for Title VII disparate impact cases”). 
189. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018). 
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unless “the adverse impact was attributable to a nonage factor that was ‘reason-
able.’”
190
 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) uses the usual framework 
as well.
191
 In the words of a statement jointly promulgated by eight federal agen-
cies, “lending discrimination under the ECOA” is established “when a lender 
applies a practice uniformly to all applicants but the practice has a discriminatory 
effect . . . and is not justified by business necessity.”
192
 The usual framework fur-
ther extends to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
193
 The statute itself 
bans employment criteria that “screen out . . . a class of individuals with disabil-
ities” unless the criteria are “job-related” and “consistent with business neces-
sity.”
194
 The usual framework even reaches beyond American shores. In a com-
parative study, Rosemary Hunter and Elaine Shoben write that “since the United 
States Supreme Court adopted the disparate impact theory of discrimination in 
Griggs, the theory has spread to every major common law jurisdiction and into 
Western Europe and the international arena.”
195
 
In sum, there currently exist two standards for assigning disparate impact 
liability. There is the usual framework, which governs the fields of employment, 
housing, age discrimination, lending discrimination, and disability discrimina-
tion, as well as the many additional contexts in which private or public entities 
receive federal funds. And there is the courts’ two-part test for section 2 vote 
denial claims. This Article’s thesis, again, is that only one disparate impact stand-
ard is actually necessary—and that it should be the usual framework that is kept, 
not the courts’ emerging section 2 test. The rest of this Part defends this position, 
relying in particular on employment law and housing law: the areas where the 
disparate impact theory has been most fully developed. 
 
190. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239, 241 (2005); see also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic 
Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 100-02 (2008) (elaborating on the ADEA’s reasonableness defense). 
Of course, the ADEA’s reference to “reasonable factors other than age,” 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), 
is not identical to the usual framework’s justification defense. It nevertheless captures the 
same idea: that employment practices that cause disparate impacts should be upheld when 
they can be explained by the defendant. 
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2018). 
192. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266, 18268 (Apr. 15, 1994); 
see also FHA Implementation, supra note 172, at 11474 (noting that HUD’s approach to dispar-
ate impact claims under the FHA “is also consistent with the discriminatory effects standard 
under ECOA, which borrows from Title VII’s burden-shifting framework” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2018). 
194. Id.; see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003) (holding that “disparate-im-
pact claims are cognizable under the ADA”). 
195. Rosemary C. Hunter & Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Discrimination: American Oddity 
or Internationally Accepted Concept?, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 108, 124 (1998). 
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B. Applicability to Voting 
How might we determine if the usual framework is applicable to voting? The 
text of section 2 could resolve the matter if it, like the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
referred explicitly to racial disparities, countervailing interests, and alternative 
practices.
196
 Section 2, though, is silent as to how liability should be imposed in 
vote denial cases. A Supreme Court decision akin to Albemarle for Title VII, or 
Inclusive Communities for the FHA, could also specify the right approach in this 
domain. But the Court has never evaluated a franchise restriction (or expansion) 
under section 2. 
In the absence of any binding authority, several factors seem relevant to the 
usual framework’s applicability to voting. One is the legislative histories of Title 
VII, the FHA, and section 2. These provisions’ drafting might illuminate how 
Congress expected them to operate with respect to racial discrepancies—and 
whether Congress had a single expectation or several. Another consideration is 
disparate impact theory. There are competing accounts of this body of law, which 
could converge or point in different directions for employment, housing, and 
voting. And a third issue is the nature of the activity. Working for pay, finding 
shelter, and casting a ballot are all vital aspects of membership in American so-




1. Legislative Histories 
In my view, each of these factors supports the usual framework’s validity for 
voting. Begin with the legislative histories of Title VII, the FHA, and section 2. 
These measures were passed within a few years of one another in the 1960s and 
represent some of that era’s greatest statutory achievements. Title VII came first 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the monumental law that John F. Kennedy’s as-
sassination and Lyndon B. Johnson’s political genius made possible.
198
 Section 2 
was next: a pillar of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the statute that Congress 
 
196. See infra Section III.A. 
197. I note that my argument in this section is primarily descriptive: that voting is sufficiently 
similar to employment and housing that the usual framework can be applied to it. I develop 
my normative claim—that the usual framework should be applied to voting—in the next two 
Sections. See infra Sections II.C, II.D. 
198. For a colorful series of essays on the Act’s passage, see THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE 
PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997). 
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enacted in the wake of the appalling violence in Selma.
199
 And last in the trio was 
the Fair Housing Act, ratified in 1968 after yet another tragedy: the murder of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and the spasm of inner-city fury his death unleashed.
200
 
Title VII, the FHA, and section 2 were close in spirit as well as in time. Their 
shared mission was to break down entrenched patterns of racial stratification in 
the economic and political spheres. Indeed, it was precisely because of their in-
terest in “the consequences of [challenged] practices, not simply the motiva-
tion,” as the Supreme Court put it in Griggs, that all three provisions were con-
strued to authorize disparate impact claims.
201
 The 1963 House report on Title 
VII thus described in detail the large racial differences in wages and joblessness 
that then existed.
202
 One of Title VII’s goals was to loosen “the economic strait-
jacket in which the Negro has been confined”—to raise “the economic standards 
of the Negro population” by ending “this severe inequality in employment.”
203
 
Likewise, in a speech subsequently quoted by the Supreme Court, the FHA’s 
principal sponsor, Senator Walter Mondale, stated that the law aimed to “replace 
the ghettos ‘by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.’”
204
 His counter-
part on the House side, Representative Emanuel Celler, agreed that the FHA 
meant to “remove the walls of discrimination which enclose minority groups” 
and to end “the blight of segregated housing and the pale of the ghetto.”
205
 The 
VRA, too, was directed at not just purposeful racial discrimination in voting but 
 
199. As I discuss below, section 2’s revision in 1982 was substantially more important than its en-
actment in 1965. See infra Section III.A. 
200. For a good account of the FHA’s legislative history, see Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: 
A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969). 
201. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
202. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 27 (1963) (additional views of Rep. William M. McCulloch et 
al.) (noting that “[i]n 1962, nonwhites made up 11 percent of the civilian labor force, but 22 
percent of the unemployed,” and that “among Negroes who are employed, their jobs are 
largely concentrated among the semiskilled and unskilled occupations”). 
203. Id. at 27-28; see also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (noting that Title 
VII was “designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy”); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The language of Title VII makes plain 
the purpose of Congress . . . to eliminate . . . racially stratified job environments to the disad-
vantage of minority citizens.”). 
204. 114 CONG. REC. 2276 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale) (“[W]e are [no longer] 
going to live separately in white ghettos and Negro ghettos . . . .”); see also Trafficante v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting Senator Mondale). 
205. 114 CONG. REC. 9559, 9563 (1968) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler); see also Tex. Dep’t of 
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015) (“Recog-
nition of disparate-impact claims is consistent with the FHA’s central purpose . . . to eradicate 
discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation’s economy.”). 
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also “the present white-Negro registration disparity.”
206
 A literacy test could 
therefore be an illegal “barrier to the franchise,” according to the 1965 Senate 
report, if its racially unequal effect was unintentional yet still “a result of recent 
legal separation of the races in education.”
207
 
Crucially, however, none of these statutes was maximalist in its ambitions, 
bent on eradicating racial discrepancies at any cost. Rather, the drafters of all 
three laws took the more moderate position that the struggle against racial strat-
ification, while important, must be balanced against other legitimate objectives. 
The House report on Title VII, for instance, stressed that the provision would 
not “promot[e] equality with mathematical certainty” or “impose forced racial 
balance upon employers or labor unions.”
208
 To the contrary, “management pre-
rogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed” as long as “jobs in 




When Congress revised the FHA in 1988, similarly, the House report on the 
amendments “recognized that liability should not attach when a justification is 
necessary to the covered entity’s business.”
210
 In Inclusive Communities, the Su-
preme Court repeatedly cited this report as support for its decision to apply the 
usual framework to FHA disparate impact claims.
211
 And as for section 2, not 
only is one of the factors recognized by the 1982 Senate report the tenuousness 
of the government’s rationale for a policy,
212
 but the measure itself states that it 
 
206. S. REP. NO. 89-162, pt. 3, at 16 (1965) (joint views of twelve members of the Judiciary Com-
mittee); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966) (observing that in 
several southern states, “registration of voting-age whites ran roughly 50 percentage points 
or more ahead of Negro registration”). 
207. S. REP. NO. 89-162, pt. 3, at 32-33 (additional views of Sen. Thomas J. Dodd et al.); see also id. 
at 33 (objecting to the poll tax regardless of its intent because it is “a far heavier economic 
burden on Negroes than on whites”). 
208. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (additional views of Rep. William M. McCulloch et al.). 
209. Id.; see also Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Im-
pact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 333 (1983) (noting 
that “both proponents and opponents of the Act agreed that Title VII did not mandate a rigid 
kind of distributive equality”). When Congress amended Title VII in 1991, it confirmed that 
the provision “does not prohibit all practices with a discriminatory effect, however, only those 
that are not justified by business necessity.” S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 40 (1990). 
210. FHA Implementation, supra note 172, at 11472 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 30 (1988)). 
211. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2519-
21 (2015). 
212. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982) (asking “whether the policy underlying the [practice] is 
tenuous”). It follows from the inclusion of this factor that there exist some policies that are 
not tenuous—that there are some excuses that can justify impositions on the rights protected 
by section 2. 
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does not require perfect racial balancing. “[N]othing in this section establishes 
a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their 
proportion in the population,”
213
 reads the “compromise disclaimer” that ena-
bled the bill’s passage.
214
 
Accordingly, the legislative histories of Title VII, the FHA, and section 2 re-
semble one another in two key respects. They establish that the provisions may 
be violated by racial disparities even in the absence of discriminatory intent. And 
they hold that liability does not necessarily follow from such disparities, depend-
ing instead on what interests the challenged practices serve and how well they 
serve them.
215
 The usual framework captures both of these themes by including 
a prima facie case, based on disparate impact alone, that may then be rebutted 
by a sufficiently compelling and tailored justification. The courts’ two-part test 
for section 2 vote denial claims, on the other hand, is true to the first theme but 
not the second. As explained earlier,
216
 the test comes too close to finding a 
breach whenever an electoral policy differentially affects minority and nonmi-
nority citizens—even if it does so for good reason. 
2. Theoretical Accounts 
Turn next to the theoretical accounts of disparate impact law. Its essence, 
from one perspective, is the removal of obstacles that unjustifiably prevent racial 
minority members from enjoying the same opportunities as nonminority mem-
bers. By lowering these hurdles, disparate impact law is supposed to improve 
conditions for minorities, to prevent their existing disadvantages from spreading 
into new areas, and ultimately to undermine the racial hierarchies of American 
society.
217
 This is the model the Griggs Court embraced when it condemned “ar-
tificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” that “operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ 
 
213. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018). 
214. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 95 (additional views of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (noting “the euphoria 
generated by the proposed ‘compromise,’ virtually ensuring the swift enactment of this meas-
ure”). 
215. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 16 (1987) (noting that, in passing Title VII, Congress both “was intent 
on securing visible and measurable improvement in employment of minorities” and “did not 
want jobs to be allocated mechanically to members of various groups by reference to popula-
tion or labor force”). 
216. See supra Section I.D. 
217. For examples of scholars discussing this account, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact 
and the Role of Classification and Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communi-
ties, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1132 (2016) (“Others have seen [disparate impact’s] function 
as more distributive—as aiming to overcome an unfair group-based distribution of jobs or 




 Hints of the model are also apparent in Inclusive Com-
munities, which quoted this language from Griggs
219
 and further criticized poli-




Another account of disparate impact law sees it as a way to target racially 
discriminatory motives that are suspected but cannot directly be proven. On this 
view, few contemporary defendants are so foolish as to create records that reveal 
their invidious objectives. In the absence of smoking guns, discriminatory intent 
must be inferred from circumstantial evidence. And perhaps the most probative 
such evidence is a significant racial disparity, caused by a particular practice, that 
could have been avoided without compromising any legitimate interest.
221
 Jus-
tice Scalia characterized disparate impact law in these terms in a 2009 concur-
rence, “framing it as simply an evidentiary tool used to identify genuine, inten-
tional discrimination—to ‘smoke out,’ as it were, disparate treatment.”
222
 The 
Inclusive Communities Court also gestured in this direction, observing that “dis-
parate-impact liability . . . plays a role in uncovering discriminatory intent.”
223
 
A third model of disparate impact law, recently developed by Joseph Fishkin, 
emphasizes its ability to eliminate (or at least widen) bottlenecks in American 
life.
224
 A bottleneck is a criterion that is applied to a certain pool of people and 
that allocates a desired good to only a subset of them. A bottleneck produces a 
racial disparity if it is harder for minority members to pass through it than for 
nonminority members. And whenever a bottleneck is lifted (or loosened), the 
 
other resources.”); and Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
1341, 1376 (2010) (“[D]isparate impact doctrine can be understood . . . as intended to redress 
self-perpetuating racial hierarchies inherited from the past . . . .”). 
218. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). 
219. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522, 
2524 (2015). 
220. Id. at 2522. 
221. Scholars presenting this account include Bagenstos, supra note 217, at 1132, Primus, supra note 
217, at 1376-77, and, most prominently, George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: 
An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1311 (1987) (“The theory of disparate 
impact only addresses the difficulty of proving pretextual discrimination . . . .”). 
222. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
223. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522. The Inclusive Communities Court, though, paired this state-
ment with a sophisticated view of discriminatory intent as “unconscious prejudices and dis-
guised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment.” Id. 
224. See, e.g., JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 10-24 
(2014); Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination Law, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1470-74 (2014) [hereinafter Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle]. 
the yale law journal 128:1566  2019 
1606 
benefits accrue not just to minorities but also to nonminorities who previously 
were unable to comply with the criterion as well.
225
 
I find some of these accounts more compelling than others. The point I want 
to make here, though, is that all of them extend to voting just as easily as to 
employment or housing. They thus provide no reason, as a matter of disparate 
impact theory, to differentiate between voting and the fields where the usual 
framework already governs. Consider the anti-racial-stratification model. In-
equality in the workplace is reduced when a hiring practice that disproportion-
ately and unnecessarily excludes minority applicants is struck down. So is resi-
dential segregation when a court invalidates a housing policy that unjustifiably 
prevents a larger fraction of minority members from settling in a given neigh-
borhood. And so too is unequal political participation when the measure being 
nullified is a voting requirement that unreasonably burdens the franchise for a 
greater share of minority citizens. 
Or take the view of disparate impact law as an “evidentiary dragnet” for pur-
poseful racial discrimination.
226
 The logic that allows an invidious aim to be in-
ferred is identical whether the practice at issue pertains to employment, housing, 
or voting. In each context, one may surmise that a defendant intends to disad-
vantage minority members when she adopts a policy that causes a substantial 
and unwarranted racial disparity. This sort of disparity in the electoral process 
seems no more or less suspicious than anywhere else. 
The claim holds for Fishkin’s bottleneck theory too. A bottleneck, again, is 
any criterion that restricts access to a good. It can therefore be a hiring test that 
job applicants must pass to earn employment, a condition for selling a house that 
homebuyers must satisfy to complete the purchase, or a voting requirement with 
which citizens must comply to cast a ballot. In each case, there is a pool of people 
who want something and a practice that permits some but not all of them to get 
it. In each case, moreover, if the bottleneck were removed, “the benefits of the 
policy change [would be] universal.”
227
 Minority and nonminority job appli-
cants, homebuyers, and citizens alike would be able to enjoy opportunities that 




225. See Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle, supra note 224, at 1498 (“The changes made to 
loosen the bottleneck apply to everyone, not only to members of the statutorily protected 
group.”). 
226. The phrase belongs to Richard Primus. See Primus, supra note 217, at 1376-77. 
227. Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle, supra note 224, at 1498. 
228. If anything, a voting bottleneck may be more problematic than an employment or housing 
bottleneck because it is harder to circumvent. Someone denied a job can apply to another 
employer; someone denied an apartment can find another landlord; but someone denied the 
franchise cannot vote without moving to another jurisdiction (if even then). 
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3. Nature of the Activity 
The final factor bearing on the usual framework’s applicability is the nature 
of voting. Voting plainly differs from employment and housing in certain key 
respects. It is exclusively regulated by the state; indeed, it cannot even occur un-
less the government first establishes and administers an electoral system.
229
 In 
contrast, private actors make most decisions about the workplace and real estate, 
based on their own considerations rather than those of any higher authority. Vot-
ing is also not a market good; it has no price set by the forces of supply and 
demand. On the other hand, market dynamics largely determine the wages of 
employees and the costs of houses.
230
 And voting is not a rival good either; when 
I cast a ballot, I do not stop you from doing the same. Conversely, when a job is 





229. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization 
of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 51 (2004) (“[E]lections and related democratic 
processes are pervasively regulated . . . .”). 
230. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1141 
(1989) (distinguishing between “political, criminal, and educational rights” and “‘ordinary’ 
social and economic goods, like jobs and housing”). 
231. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 304 (1971) 
(observing that “enfranchising an illiterate . . . [does not] deprive the literate of the vote,” 
while “the job that goes to one cannot go to the other”). 
    Another difference between voting and all other goods (including employment and 
housing) is that it is arguably antecedent to them. Voting, that is, helps to allocate political 
power, and thus to set the terms on which all other goods are granted (at least to the extent 
the state is involved in the goods’ provision). As the Supreme Court put it more than a century 
ago, the franchise is “a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.” Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). This point is true enough, but it does not counsel 
against the usual framework’s adoption in the section 2 context. Voting may be conceptually 
upstream from all other goods, but it is not more important than them, nor are a jurisdiction’s 
justifications for limiting the franchise rendered irrelevant by its antecedent status. 
    A further contrast between voting and other areas is that defendants may have more of 
an incentive to discriminate racially with respect to voting. Racial discrimination in, say, the 
employment context is often irrational because it prevents employers from hiring the best 
possible employees (who may, of course, be minorities). In the voting domain, though, racial 
discrimination is frequently highly beneficial to politicians because of the severe racial polar-
ization of American politics. By burdening the votes of minority citizens, in particular, politi-
cians unlikely to receive those votes can improve their odds of staying in office. This point, 
too, is accurate but orthogonal to the issue of whether the usual framework should be imple-
mented under section 2. If discriminatory intent is more prevalent with respect to voting, then 
liability is simply more likely to be found under both the Constitution and whatever test is 
used in statutory vote denial cases. 
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Significant as these distinctions are, they do not render the usual framework 
any less apt for voting. Instead, they either are legally irrelevant or suggest that 
courts should have fewer qualms about striking down electoral (versus employ-
ment or housing) practices. Start with the fact that the defendant in section 2 
vote denial cases is necessarily the government. This does not actually distin-
guish these cases from Title VII and FHA suits, which can be brought against 
public employers and housing providers as readily as against private ones. Ad-
ditionally, the governmental status of section 2 defendants simply means that 
public rather than private interests must be analyzed under the usual frame-
work’s second and third prongs. Public interests like preventing fraud, conserv-
ing resources, and efficiently administering elections are different from the pri-
vate pursuit of profit. But they are no less amenable to being weighed for their 
importance, scrutinized for their fit with challenged policies, and having this fit 
compared to that of alternative measures.
232
 
Similarly, the main implication of voting not being a market good is that 
there is no market-based reason to limit it. The restriction of the franchise, that 
is, cannot be justified by what Griggs called “business necessity”
233
 or Inclusive 
Communities described as “the practical business choices and profit-related deci-
sions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system.”
234
 The most 
familiar (and perhaps the most powerful) rationale for permitting racial dispar-
ities is thus off the table when it comes to disputed electoral practices. To defend 
such disparities, jurisdictions must resort to less common (and maybe less com-
pelling) interests than profit maximization. 
As for voting’s lack of scarcity, it too cuts in favor of liability in section 2 cases. 
When a good (like employment or housing) is in short supply, courts may be 
concerned about the innocent victims of their decisions: the nonminority job 
applicants who would no longer get offers if a hiring criterion were dropped, the 
nonminority homebuyers who would no longer be sold units if a housing policy 
were revised, and so on.
235
 These worries may convince courts not to strike down 
 
232. Recognizing the equivalence of public and private interests under the usual framework, HUD 
simply substituted the phrase “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest” for Title 
VII’s “business necessity” when it promulgated its disparate impact rule. FHA Implementa-
tion, supra note 172, at 11470. HUD noted approvingly that the former term “applies to indi-
viduals, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and public entities.” Id. (emphasis added); see also 
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 
(2015) (citing this HUD analysis and referring interchangeably to “housing authorities and 
private developers” as FHA defendants). 
233. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
234. 135 S. Ct. at 2518. 
235. For a good discussion of such “visible victims,” see Primus, supra note 217, at 1369-75. 
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challenged practices, or at least to dilute the remedies they ultimately impose. 
But with a nonrivalrous good like voting, there is no risk of such collateral dam-
age. A ruling that makes it easier for minority citizens to vote does not impede 
nonminority citizens from casting ballots. In fact, it helps them to vote, thus 
yielding innocent beneficiaries rather than victims—a dynamic that could plausi-
bly induce courts to err on the side of liability in section 2 litigation.
236
 
C. Answered Questions 
Several different modes of analysis, then, lead to the same conclusion: that 
the usual framework is applicable to section 2 vote denial claims. The VRA’s leg-
islative history, like those of Title VII and the FHA, expresses concern about un-
justified, but not all, racial disparities. The theoretical accounts of disparate im-
pact law make as much sense for voting as for employment and housing. And 
while voting (unlike employment and housing) is a nonmarket, nonrivalrous 
good regulated solely by the state, these features simply make the usual frame-
work more likely to result in proplaintiff rulings in electoral cases.
237
 
Not only is the usual framework applicable to section 2 vote denial claims; it 
also should, in fact, be applied to them. One reason why, to which I now turn, is 
that in the decades in which the usual framework has been used under Title VII 
and the FHA, courts, legislatures, and agencies have arrived at answers—reason-
able answers—to the questions that have divided judges under section 2. If the 
usual framework were extended to section 2, these doctrinal solutions would 
 
236. See id. at 1381 (noting that VRA remedies generally do not create visible victims); see also Paul 
Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Nondiscrimination Principle, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 36 (1976) (“The voting test suspension remedies have been relatively un-
controversial because they do not frustrate the legitimate expectations of third parties or pre-
fer the intended beneficiaries to others similarly situated . . . .”). 
237. This is a good place to note that, in my view, the usual framework is inapplicable to section 2 
vote dilution claims. First, the Supreme Court has already specified a different approach for 
vote dilution claims. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Second, section 2’s legis-
lative history identifies a series of factors, most importantly racial polarization in voting, that 
must be considered in vote dilution cases but that are foreign to the usual framework. See S. 
REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-30 (1982). And third, conceptually, vote dilution is concerned above all 
with the legislative representation of racially defined groups. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 
28, at 1361-93. This focus on group representation sharply distinguishes section 2 vote dilution 
claims from the usual framework, in which election outcomes play no role and the overriding 
goal is to avoid unjustified racial disparities in political participation. The focus on group rep-
resentation also explains why vote dilution law emphasizes issues like racial polarization and 
geographic compactness that appear nowhere in the usual framework. These issues have no 
bearing on whether a disparate impact exists or is justified—but they have everything to do 
with whether a minority group is adequately legislatively represented. 
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presumably come with it. They would thereby settle disputes that show no sign 
of fading on their own and lend coherence to a body of law whose current hall-
mark is disagreement over matters large and small.
238
 
1. Specific Practice or Entire System? 
The first unanswered question about section 2 vote denial claims is whether 
they should be brought against specific electoral practices or systems of election 
administration in their entirety.
239
 In the Title VII context, Congress opted in 
most circumstances for particularity in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Echoing a 
pair of earlier Supreme Court decisions,
240
 Congress required “the complaining 
party [to] demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice 
causes a disparate impact.”
241
 The only exception arises “if the complaining party 
can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking 
process are not capable of separation for analysis.”
242
 HUD took the same posi-
tion when it clarified the operation of the usual framework in FHA cases. In gen-
eral, a plaintiff must “identif[y] the specific practice that caused the alleged dis-
criminatory effect.”
243
 On occasion, though, “it may be appropriate to challenge 
the decision-making process as a whole.”
244
 
The point of this particularity requirement is to focus litigation—to prevent 
it from sprawling into all of a defendant’s policies and all of the effects they might 
have, individually or in unison.
245
 The requirement is also advantageous to de-
fendants, on balance. It forces plaintiffs either to isolate the measures that, in 
their view, cause racial disparities or to convince courts that no such isolation is 
 
238. For a detailed discussion of this doctrinal discord, see supra Section I.C. 
239. See supra Section I.C.1. 
240. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (“[A] plaintiff must 
demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that has 
created the disparate impact under attack.”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 
U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“The plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific 
employment practice that is challenged.”). 
241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2018). 
242. Id. 
243. FHA Implementation, supra note 172, at 11469. 
244. Id. 
245. See generally Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair 
Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 459-60 
(1998) (discussing in detail the particularity requirement). 
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possible. As a result, defendants may avoid liability when plaintiffs cannot pin-
point the responsible practices or, even if found liable, defendants may be com-
pelled to change only small parts of their decision-making processes. These 
prodefendant elements may explain why the Supreme Court first endorsed par-




In section 2 vote denial cases, particularity would typically oblige plaintiffs 
to establish separately the racial disparity attributable to each challenged elec-
toral policy. Except in unusual circumstances, plaintiffs would not be able to 
point to an overall difference in political participation by race and then to ascribe 
it to the totality of a jurisdiction’s voting practices. Also precluded would be ju-
dicial analyses that “consider the sum of those parts and their cumulative effect 
on minority access to the ballot box,” in the Fourth Circuit’s words,
247
 or that 
“look not at [a measure] in isolation but to the entire voting and registration 
system,” as the Seventh Circuit put it.
248
 Court decisions of this kind plainly ag-
gregate electoral policies instead of disentangling them and then assessing them 
one by one. 
2. Does the Size of the Disparity Matter? 
The second question that has perplexed courts in section 2 vote denial cases 
is whether any racial disparity is actionable or only one that reaches a certain 
size.
249
 As early as Albemarle, the Supreme Court held that, under Title VII, only 
employment practices that have “significantly different” effects on minorities and 
nonminorities establish a prima facie case.
250
 Consistent with this ruling, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) published guidelines in 
1978 stating that “[a] selection rate for any race . . . which is less than four-fifths 
(4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will gen-
erally be regarded . . . as evidence of adverse impact.”
251
 The guidelines added 
 
246. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (adopting “this specific 
causation requirement” despite the counterargument that it is “unduly burdensome on Title 
VII plaintiffs”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1074, as recognized in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
247. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 242 (4th Cir. 2014). 
248. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014). 
249. See supra Section I.C.2. 
250. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Con-
necticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (requiring “a significantly discriminatory impact”). 
251. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2018). 
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that “[s]maller differences in selection rate” may also suffice if “they are signifi-
cant in both statistical and practical terms.”
252
 Since their issuance, courts have 
often cited the guidelines but have not followed them slavishly. As the Supreme 
Court has observed, the guidelines have functioned as “a rule of thumb.”
253
 
The reason to require a significant (not just any) racial disparity is to direct 
enforcement efforts toward the more meaningful disparate impacts in American 
society.
254
 Disparate impacts are ubiquitous, alas, so if they were all actionable, 
many institutions might be paralyzed by litigation and more severe discrepancies 
could be overshadowed by relatively trivial ones.
255
 Additionally, as several 
scholars have pointed out, the four-fifths rule cannot be used in all circum-
stances. When minority and nonminority selection rates are low, in particular, 
the difference between them is more informative than their ratio.
256
 The four-
fifths rule can also be misleading when the sample size is small because the ob-
served ratio is then the result of a limited number of observations.
257
 Due to 
these drawbacks, academics have urged
258





253. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 
U.S. 977, 995-96 n.3 (1988) (plurality opinion)). In the FHA context, interestingly, HUD 
declined to “codify a significance requirement” due to “the numerous and varied practices and 
wide variety of private and governmental entities covered by the Act.” FHA Implementation, 
supra note 172, at 11468. For a recent article that does address the issue of significance in FHA 
cases, see Robert G. Schwemm & Calvin Bradford, Proving Disparate Impact in Fair Housing 
Cases After Inclusive Communities, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 685, 697-710 (2016). 
254. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. 
L.J. 773, 791 (2009) (describing this requirement as “well-suited for aiding courts in deter-
mining whether a disparity is sufficiently large to matter—that is, whether it has practical 
significance”). 
255. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 696 (2011) (“Ad-
verse impact is everywhere, and the world is full of disparate impact lawsuits waiting to hap-
pen.”). 
256. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 154 
(1980); Elaine W. Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof 
Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793, 810 (1978); Wax, supra note 255, at 629. 
257. See, e.g., BALDUS & COLE, supra note 256, at 88-90; SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 160, at 50; 
Shoben, supra note 256, at 809. 
258. See sources cited supra notes 256-257; see also RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, 
THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION § 5:7, at 5-19 (1994) (“Plaintiffs should have the option, 
however, of demonstrating adverse impact by statistical significance instead of the four-fifths 
rule.”); Peresie, supra note 254, at 776 (arguing that these two approaches “fulfill complemen-
tary roles and thus should [not] be viewed . . . as alternatives”). 
259. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988) (plurality opinion) 
(describing how courts have used both the four-fifths rule and “the ‘standard deviation’ an-
alysis”). 
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that the four-fifths rule should be supplemented by scrutiny of whether the dif-
ference in selection rates is statistically significant. 
Applying these methods to section 2 vote denial claims, small, statistically 
insignificant disparities would not give rise to liability. Normatively, the Fourth 
Circuit might be right that “even one disenfranchised voter . . . is too many,”
260
 
but legally it would be wrong. At a more granular level, the methods would op-
erate as follows: First, the selection rates for otherwise qualified minority and 
nonminority citizens would be determined—that is, the rates at which they are 
able to comply with a given requirement for voting. (Survey evidence could be 
used to calculate these rates, as could a jurisdiction’s own electoral records.) 
Next, the lower of the rates would be divided by the higher, and the statistical 
significance of the difference between the rates would be computed. A prima fa-
cie case would most clearly be established when the rates’ ratio is below four-
fifths and the rates’ difference is statistically significant. Conversely, a plaintiff’s 
claim would be weaker if the four-fifths rule was not satisfied or statistical sig-
nificance was not shown. 
3. Ability to Comply or Effect on Turnout? 
Third, which selection rates, exactly, should be considered in this analysis: 
minority and nonminority citizens’ capacities for compliance with a provision, 
or their eventual levels of voter turnout?
261
 In the 1982 case of Connecticut v. 
Teal,
262
 the Supreme Court held that Title VII is concerned with the direct effects 
of employment practices, not their downstream consequences. The Court faced 
an employer whose written exam for promotion to supervisor had a disparate 
racial impact but whose affirmative-action program ensured a proportionate 
share of minority supervisors.
263
 The Court ruled that the “‘bottom line’” of pro-
portionality “does not preclude [plaintiffs] from establishing a prima facie case, 
nor does it provide [defendants] with a defense to such a case.”
264
 The Court 
explained that a racial disparity at one stage of the promotion process, which 
bars certain minority employees from becoming supervisors, cannot be offset by 
racial balance after the process has concluded, which benefits a different set of 
minority employees. “Title VII does not permit the victim of a . . . discriminatory 
 
260. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 244 (4th Cir. 2014). 
261. See supra Section I.C.3. 
262. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
263. Id. at 443-44. 
264. Id. at 442. 
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policy to be told that he has not been wronged because other persons of his or 
her race . . . were hired.”
265
 
In a section 2 vote denial suit, a particular electoral practice is the analogue 
to the written exam that was disputed in Teal. And voter turnout by race is the 
equivalent of the supervisors’ racial makeup: the “bottom line” that is the out-
come of the entire electoral system in the former case, and the whole promotion 
process in the latter. Under Teal, it is plain that voter turnout (like the makeup 
of the supervisor pool) is legally irrelevant. Plaintiffs need not prove a racial dis-
parity in turnout; defendants cannot escape liability by showing that minority 
and nonminority citizens vote at similar rates—and the numerous lower courts 
that have held to the contrary are incorrect.
266
 Under Teal, too, the disparate im-
pact that does matter is the one directly caused by the electoral policy at issue. 
Plaintiffs’ burden is simply to demonstrate that minority citizens have more dif-
ficulty abiding by the policy than do nonminority citizens. 
4. Is Interaction with Discrimination Necessary? 
Fourth, once plaintiffs have met this burden, must they also establish that 
the reason for the policy’s disparate impact is its interaction with social and his-
torical discrimination?
267
 In the 1977 case of Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme 
Court addressed two hiring criteria for Alabama prison guards: a minimum 
height of five feet two inches and a minimum weight of 120 pounds.
268
 In tan-
dem, these criteria excluded far more women (forty-one percent ) than men (less 
than one percent).
269
 But they did so not through any interaction with discrim-
inatory conditions, but rather because women, as a biological matter, tend to be 
shorter and lighter than men. The Court nevertheless found Alabama liable un-
der Title VII on a disparate impact theory.
270
 The Court thus codified the prin-
ciples that “the reason the [practice] has an adverse impact is [not] at issue” and 
 
265. Id. at 455; see also id. (“Congress never intended to give an employer license to discriminate 
against some employees on the basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats other 
members of the employees’ group.”). The EEOC, however, states in its guidelines that if “the 
total selection process does not have an adverse impact,” then federal agencies generally “will 
not take enforcement action based upon adverse impact of any component of that process.” 
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C) (2018); see also Teal, 457 U.S. at 453 n.12 (discussing the EEOC’s posi-
tion). 
266. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. 
267. See supra Section I.C.4. 
268. 433 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1977). 
269. Id. at 329-30. 
270. Id. at 331. 
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It is true, as noted earlier,
272
 that most racial disparities can be connected to 
social and historical discrimination. Disparities like those in Dothard, attributa-
ble to biology rather than to prejudice, are quite unusual, especially if the rele-
vant cleavage is race instead of gender.
273
 But it is also true that proving a policy’s 
interaction with discriminatory conditions can be difficult, requiring discovery 
and expert testimony about a host of issues extraneous to the challenged meas-
ure. Dothard’s approach therefore saves plaintiffs the time and cost of document-
ing discrimination and its implications—even though, typically, they could do so 
if they had to (and if money were no object).
274
 
Dothard may be the Supreme Court decision most inconsistent with the 
lower courts’ two-part test for section 2 vote denial claims. The test’s second 
prong (and conceptual centerpiece) is the linkage of a racial discrepancy to a 
practice’s interaction with social and historical discrimination.
275
 This is the 
prong to which the Senate factors are relevant, and on which courts spend much 
of their analytical energy.
276
 Yet Dothard holds that all of this judicial exertion is 
unnecessary. Why a policy causes a disparate impact is immaterial; the disparity 
alone is enough to establish a prima facie case (so long as it is substantial and 
the direct result of a specific measure).
277
 Accordingly, Dothard has the potential 
to transform section 2 vote denial litigation. It would negate one of the elements 
of the lower courts’ test, and along with that prong, the Senate factors that have 
been used to analyze it. These doctrinal features do not exist under Title VII, and 
 
271. Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed 
Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 963; see also, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Im-
pact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 959 (2005) (“Dothard 
is significant because it cut disparate impact free from any necessity that the disparity’s cause 
be traced either to de jure or more general societal discrimination . . . .”). 
272. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text. 
273. Indeed, in the vote denial context, it is hard to think of any racial disparities that could be tied 
to biology. What possible electoral policy could disproportionately affect minority citizens be-
cause of biological differences between them and nonminority citizens? 
274. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 
1402-03 (2017) (arguing that if interaction with social and historical discrimination had to be 
proven, “an evidentiary quagmire would arise from trying to sort out which mechanisms gen-
erated the disparities”). 
275. See supra Section I.A. 
276. See id. 
277. See supra Sections II.C.1-.3 (discussing the particularity, substantiality, and directness require-
ments). 
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if disparate impact law were unified, they would not remain under section 2 ei-
ther. 
5. Are Minority Preferences a Defense? 
Fifth, even if plaintiffs need not identify the reason for a practice’s disparate 
impact, can defendants avoid liability by showing that minorities’ subjective pref-
erences are the explanation?
278
 Dothard suggests the answer is no. Alabama ar-
gued that women were underrepresented in its workforce because few of them 
were “seriously interested in applying[] for prison guard positions.”
279
 The 
Court rejected this defense because applicant interest can be shaped by the very 
criterion at issue. “A potential applicant could easily determine her height and 
weight and conclude that to make an application would be futile.”
280
 In a portion 
of Wards Cove that is still good law, the Court elaborated that the “proper com-
parison” under Title VII is “between the racial composition of the qualified per-
sons in the labor market and the persons holding at-issue jobs.”
281
 The qualified 
persons in the labor market, of course, are not those who are interested in a posi-
tion or who have actually applied for it but, rather, the individuals with the req-
uisite skills and experience to do the job effectively. The qualified persons’ sub-
jective preferences, in other words, are beside the point.
282
 
If the lack-of-interest defense were unavailable in section 2 vote denial cases, 
then jurisdictions could not claim that minorities are more affected by a policy 
because they prefer to participate electorally in ways targeted by the policy. With 
respect to a voter-purge law, contra the Third Circuit, it would be irrelevant that 
 
278. See supra Section I.C.5. 
279. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 348 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). 
280. Id. at 330 (majority opinion); see also id. (“[O]therwise qualified people might be discouraged 
from applying because of a self-recognized inability to meet the very standards challenged as 
being discriminatory.”). 
281. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
282. In the leading article on the lack-of-interest defense, Vicki Schultz agrees that “[i]f the dis-
parate impact model is to have any meaning,” the defense cannot apply to it. Vicki Schultz, 
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace 
in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1762 n.44 
(1990); cf. Peter Siegelman, Contributory Disparate Impacts in Employment Discrimination Law, 
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 515, 534 (2007) (noting that “no court has ever based its decision on 
the ‘failure to train’ rationale,” a defense that is similar to lack of interest). 
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minorities are removed from the rolls at higher rates because they more fre-
quently “choose” not to vote or register.
283
 With respect to a ban on same-day 
voter registration, likewise, its disparate impact could not be excused on the 
ground that minorities “preferred to use [same-day registration] over [other reg-
istration] methods.”
284
 These are classic arguments about minorities’ inclina-
tions, which would have no place in the doctrine. 
6. How Does Tenuousness Work? 
Sixth, turning from barred defenses to ones that are very much available, 
what kinds of justifications, tied in which ways to disputed measures, may juris-
dictions offer for the measures’ disparate impacts?
285
 HUD discussed these is-
sues in detail in its statement about the usual framework’s operation in FHA 
cases. “[A]ny interest justifying a practice with a discriminatory effect,” the 
agency announced, must be “substantial, legitimate, [and] nondiscrimina-
tory.”
286
 “A ‘substantial’ interest is a core interest of the organization that has a 
direct relationship to the function of that organization.”
287
 A legitimate interest 
is one that is “genuine and not false.”
288
 And a nondiscriminatory interest “does 
not itself discriminate based on a protected characteristic.”
289
 Moreover, the de-
fendant must prove not only the existence of a substantial, legitimate, and non-
discriminatory interest, but also “the necessity of the challenged practice to 
achieve that interest.”
290
 This necessity requirement, according to HUD, “best 
effectuates the broad, remedial goal of the [FHA]” and is “comparable to the 




283. Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 315 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
284. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 351 (M.D.N.C.), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 
224 (4th Cir. 2014). 
285. See supra Section I.C.6. 




290. Id. at 11471 (emphasis added). 
291. Id. at 11471-72. In Inclusive Communities, the Court agreed with HUD’s formulation, holding 
that “housing authorities and private developers [must] be allowed to maintain a policy if 
they can prove it is necessary to achieve a valid interest.” Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs 
v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (emphasis added). 
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These Title VII protections have not been articulated as clearly as their FHA 
counterparts
292
 but are materially equivalent. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
“job related[ness]” and “business necessity” are the rationales an employer may 
assert for an employment practice’s disparate impact.
293
 These rationales, the 
Act’s accompanying Senate report adds, are synonymous with “effective job per-
formance.”
294
 The report further states that “the employer must prove that the 
practice . . . [is] essential to effective job performance,” meaning that “the rela-
tionship between the practice and effective job performance must be a close 
one.”
295
 The gold standard for establishing this relationship, per the EEOC’s 
guidelines, is a formal validation study “consist[ing] of empirical data demon-
strating that the selection procedure is predictive of or significantly correlated 
with important elements of job performance.”
296
 However, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that while validation studies may be advisable, “employers 




This justification defense is a vital component of the usual framework. With-
out it, the framework would imperil all measures that cause disparate impacts, 
thus flouting Congress’s intent that liability be limited to unwarranted racial dis-
parities.
298
 If the defense were recognized in section 2 vote denial cases, the Sen-
ate factor asking “whether the policy underlying the [electoral practice] is tenu-
ous”
299
 would rise dramatically in importance. This, after all, is the only factor 
relating to the strength of a jurisdiction’s rationale for a voting requirement. 
Tenuousness, then, would no longer be an afterthought for courts, as it (mostly) 
 
292. See, e.g., Wax, supra note 255, at 633 (complaining that “courts vary widely in the standards 
they apply and retain broad discretion in deciding what kind of evidence satisfies the business 
necessity defense”). 
293. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2018). Even though they are conceptually distinct, job re-
latedness and business necessity are not often analyzed separately in Title VII cases. Griggs, 
notably, referred to them interchangeably. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 
(1971). 
294. S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 41 (1990). 
295. Id. at 42; see also id. (further explaining that “use of the disputed practice [must] produce[] 
workers who effectively perform important aspects of the job”). 
296. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(B) (2018). The EEOC’s guidelines go into great detail specifying technical 
standards for validation studies. See id. § 1607.14; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975) (approvingly citing these standards). 
297. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also, e.g., 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 n.13 (1976) (“[T]here is no single method for appro-
priately validating employment tests for their relationship to job performance.”). 
298. See supra Section II.B.1. 
299. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982). 




 Instead, it would be a distinct element of the cause of action—a con-
sideration that would have to be addressed whenever it was raised by a jurisdic-
tion. 
But while the tenuousness factor bears some resemblance to the justification 
defense, its actual wording leaves room for improvement. For one thing, the fac-
tor does not specify which party bears the burden of proving tenuousness (or 
the lack thereof). Under the defense, this burden is squarely on the jurisdiction 
maintaining the voting requirement. For another, it is somewhat awkward to 
speak of proving the lack of tenuousness. It would be better to say (as the defense 
does) that the jurisdiction must show that its electoral practice is justified. And 
tenuousness pertains to the substantiality of a jurisdiction’s interest but not to 
how well this interest is advanced by a given policy. Again, a preferable formu-
lation would encompass both an interest’s weight and a measure’s fit with it. 
Accordingly, the tenuousness factor should not simply be lifted from the Senate 
report into the legal test for section 2 vote denial claims. Rather, it should first 
be amended so that it mirrors the justification defense under Title VII and the 
FHA. 
7. What Is the Remedy? 
Lastly, once a court finds a jurisdiction liable, what relief should the court 
order?
301
 Under Title VII, “the usual remedy in a disparate impact case” is “gen-
eral invalidation of the challenged policy.”
302
 The court simply nullifies the un-
lawful employment practice; it does not try to reduce the practice’s racial dispar-
ities or to make it more “consistent with business necessity.”
303
 Under the FHA, 
similarly, the Supreme Court held in Inclusive Communities that “[r]emedial or-
ders in disparate-impact cases should concentrate on the elimination of the of-
fending practice.”
304
 But in both employment and housing doctrine there is prec-
edent for more aggressive relief: in particular, the adoption of race-conscious 
measures that aim to reverse the effects of the defendant’s discrimination. In the 
1986 case of Local 28 v. EEOC, a plurality of the Court held that “affirmative race-
 
300. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text. 
301. See supra Section I.C.7. 
302. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 680 (2001); see 
also Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle, supra note 224, at 1498 (noting that “on the remedy 
side, [disparate impact] law is universal and race-neutral”). 
303. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2018). 
304. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 
(2015). 
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conscious relief . . . may be appropriate where an employer or a labor union has 
engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to dissi-
pate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination.”
305
 The Inclusive Commu-
nities Court likewise cautioned that “[r]emedial orders that impose racial targets 
or quotas might raise more difficult constitutional questions,” but did not cate-
gorically bar such approaches.
306
 
Extending these remedial principles to section 2 vote denial claims, courts 
should generally strike down electoral practices that they deem illegal. They 
should not try—as the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have attempted
307
—to relax 
burdensome policies while still leaving them in place. Under Title VII and the 
FHA, this kind of remedial creativity is for defendants, not courts. Under those 
provisions, though, a different sort of remedial resourcefulness is judicially per-
missible. In extreme cases involving large and longstanding disparate impacts, 
courts may consider race-conscious relief like targeted outreach to minority cit-
izens and poll-worker training to accommodate minority voters.
308
 Still more 
racially explicit measures are conceivable, too, but should probably be avoided 
lest they raise the “difficult constitutional questions” flagged by Inclusive Com-
munities.
309
 Under current law, less drastic steps like outreach and training are 




* * * 
If disparate impact law were unified, then, section 2 vote denial cases would 
follow the same rules as Title VII and FHA proceedings. (1) Plaintiffs would 
challenge particular electoral practices, not whole systems of election administra-
tion. (2) Substantial (but not all) racial disparities in citizens’ access to the fran-
chise would be actionable. (3) Disparities caused directly by disputed practices 
 
305. 478 U.S. 421, 445 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also, e.g., Eric Schnapper, The Varieties of Nu-
merical Remedies, 39 STAN. L. REV. 851, 852 (1987) (noting that “courts quickly arrived at a 
consensus in favor of permitting [race-conscious] remedies”). 
306. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524. 
307. See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text. 
308. For a rare example of such measures being ordered in a section 2 vote denial case, see United 
States v. Berks County, 277 F. Supp. 2d 570, 583-85 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
309. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524. 
310. See id. at 2525 (conceding that “race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper 
fashion” when crafting remedies). A racial quota is the quintessential example of a more ag-
gressive race-conscious remedy. In the electoral context, the judicial imposition of a quota is 
almost unthinkable. It is very hard to imagine a court barring nonminority citizens from vot-
ing, or otherwise burdening their exercise of the franchise, in order to eliminate a racial dis-
parity. 
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would be relevant, while ultimate voter turnout would not be. (4) Disparities 
would not have to be linked to practices’ interaction with social and historical 
discrimination. (5) Nor would it matter if disparities stem from minorities’ sub-
jective preferences. (6) If a prima facie case were established, a jurisdiction could 
try to show (with empirical evidence) that its electoral policy is necessary to 
achieve a valid interest.
311
 And (7) if liability were imposed, invalidation of the 
offending measure would typically be the remedy. 
To be clear, I do not claim that all of these doctrinal parameters are optimal. 
Rather, my argument is that they are reasonable—consistent with the goals of 
disparate impact law and plausibly balancing plaintiffs’ and defendants’ inter-
ests—and, equally importantly, that they are settled under Title VII and the FHA. 
The unification of disparate impact law would thus answer many of the lingering 
questions about section 2 vote denial claims and answer them in defensible ways. 




D. Resolved Concerns 
There is one more reason to extend the usual framework to section 2 vote 
denial claims. It is to dispel the constitutional cloud that hangs over the two-part 
test that courts have applied thus far to these suits.
313
 Compared to this test, the 
usual framework would find liability less often because it would arm jurisdic-
tions with a potent new defense: that their electoral practices are necessary to 
further their substantial interests. By limiting fault in this way, the usual frame-
work would improve section 2’s congruence and proportionality with the Re-
construction Amendments. Discriminatory intent must be shown to prove a vi-
olation under these provisions, and it can often be inferred when a voting 
 
311. And if this showing were made, the plaintiff could try to prove that the jurisdiction’s interest 
could be comparably advanced by some other policy that produces a smaller racial disparity. 
See supra Section II.A. I did not discuss this aspect of the usual framework in this Section 
because courts in section 2 vote denial cases have not disagreed with respect to it. See supra 
Section I.C. 
312. For good discussions of the value of doctrinal unity, see Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Pre-
diction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38-40 
(1994); and Eric Stein, Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided-Power System: The United States’ 
Experience, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1081, 1088-92 (1986). Doctrinal unity, moreover, is just one of 
the reasons to abide by the usual framework’s answers to the questions that persist about vote 
denial law. The others are (1) the reasonableness of these answers; (2) the answers’ con-
sistency with the history and theory of disparate impact law, see supra Section II.B; and (3) 
the fact that some of the answers may be constitutionally compelled, see infra Section II.D. 
313. For a discussion of this constitutional uncertainty, see supra Section I.D. 
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requirement unjustifiably causes a racial disparity. The usual framework would 
also ease the tension between section 2 and the colorblindness principle that, ac-
cording to the current Supreme Court, animates the Equal Protection Clause. 
Jurisdictions would not have to consider race to the same extent because they 
could be confident that, if their electoral policies are warranted, the measures 
would not be at risk. 
As a logical matter, the argument that the usual framework restricts liability 
relative to the courts’ two-part test is ironclad.
314
 In most circumstances, the 
two-part test boils down to a single inquiry: whether an electoral practice pro-
duces a disparate impact.
315
 In contrast, the usual framework never stops with 
proof of a racial disparity; it always gives a jurisdiction an opportunity to justify 
the discrepancy. Whenever a justification is successfully presented (and the 
plaintiff cannot identify a comparably effective but less discriminatory alterna-
tive), liability does not arise under the usual framework even though it does un-
der the two-part test. The framework’s reach is thus a subset of the test’s. Some 
policies are unlawful under the test but not the framework, while no measures 
are proscribed by the framework but not the test. 
Empirical studies of Title VII, the FHA, and Title VI confirm this reasoning. 
They demonstrate that, far from being toothless, the usual framework’s justifi-
cation defense frequently accounts for plaintiffs’ defeats in disparate impact 
cases. With respect to Title VII, Michael Selmi surveyed about three hundred 
decisions from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.
316
 He found that plaintiffs prevailed 
in only twenty to twenty-five percent of these disputes,
317
 and that “the business 
necessity prong . . . always proved [a] greater hurdle” than establishing a racial 
disparity.
318
 In challenges to hiring tests, in particular, “[a]s employers began to 
validate their examinations”—that is, to show they are related to effective job 




With respect to the FHA, similarly, Stacy Seicshnaydre analyzed all ninety-
two appellate decisions involving disparate impact claims between 1971 and 
 
314. At least, the argument is ironclad if all of the elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case are 
held constant. As explained above, there remains considerable doubt about these elements 
under existing section 2 doctrine. See supra Sections I.C.1-.5, II.C.1-.5. 
315. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text. 
316. See Selmi, supra note 14, at 734-35. 
317. See id. at 738-39. 
318. Id. at 749. 
319. Id. at 742. 




 Again, plaintiffs’ win rate was just 20%
321
 and defendants had an “easier 
time” justifying their policies, especially when the measures sought to improve 
housing rather than to limit access to it.
322
 As to Title VI too, Charles Abernathy 
examined all sixteen appellate decisions in which disparate impact theories were 
raised.
323
 Once more, plaintiffs were victorious less than 15% of the time,
324
 and 
it was the “balancing defense . . . that eventually undermined Title VI in the 
lower appellate courts.”
325
 “The interests asserted by grantees . . . [were] by any 
measure substantial,” and “judges [could not] say that these [were] less im-
portant than the fight against residual effects of racial distinctiveness.”
326
 
These experiences with the usual framework suggest that if it were extended 
to section 2 vote denial claims, plaintiffs would often lose their suits.
327
 More-
over, a key reason they would often lose would be the usual framework’s justifi-
cation defense. Jurisdictions would assert interests allegedly served by their elec-
toral practices, and courts would hold that the interests are substantial and that 
the practices are necessary to achieve them. To be sure, many Title VII and FHA 
decisions may be of limited relevance here because the interests they evaluate are 
job relatedness and business necessity. These market-based concerns have no 
equivalent in the nonmarket domain of voting.
328
 But some Title VII and FHA 
cases, and all Title VI disputes, feature governmental defendants invoking public 
rationales for their policies. These scenarios are analogous to the section 2 vote 
denial context, and so are probative of how the usual framework would operate 
in this new area.
329
 
Why would section 2 be less constitutionally vulnerable, though, if it were 
harder to satisfy? The explanations are straightforward. Start with Congress’s 
 
320. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 14, at 391-92. 
321. See id. at 393, 399 fig.6. 
322. Id. at 413-14. 
323. See Abernathy, supra note 188, at 312. All of these decisions were announced prior to Alexander 
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which held that no private right of action exists to enforce 
disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI. 
324. See Abernathy, supra note 188, at 312 (noting just two decisions in plaintiffs’ favor). 
325. Id. at 286. 
326. Id. at 313-14. 
327. In fact, section 2 plaintiffs already lose most of their suits. See Cox & Miles, supra note 28, at 
13-14 (observing that “decisions in our dataset assigned section 2 liability about 30% of the 
time” and that “the rate at which courts found section 2 liability exceeded 40% during 1982-
1989 . . . , but it fell to 26% during the 1990s”). 
328. See supra Section II.B.3. 
329. I do not consider here how the usual framework would apply to particular electoral practices. 
For analyses along these lines, see infra Part IV. 
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authority to enact the provision, which depends on the “congruence and propor-
tionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted 
to that end.”
330
 The harm to be avoided or cured by the Reconstruction Amend-
ments is intentional racial discrimination.
331
 Such discrimination can seldom be 
deduced from a racial disparity alone. As the Supreme Court has explained, a 
“disproportionate impact” has “limited probative value” by itself, and “cases are 
rare” in which it means that an “invidious discriminatory purpose was a moti-
vating factor.”
332
 Conversely, when a racial discrepancy cannot be justified by a 
valid interest, it becomes easier to conclude that an illicit aim is afoot. Per Inclu-
sive Communities, a needless discrepancy helps to “uncover[] discriminatory in-




If disparate impact law were unified, then, section 2 would prohibit only elec-
toral practices that are, or plausibly might be, driven by racial bias. Section 2, 
that is, would bar only governmental activity that unjustifiably causes a racial 
disparity—and that thus supports a finding of a discriminatory purpose. This 
narrower scope, in turn, would enhance section 2’s congruence and proportion-
ality with the Reconstruction Amendments. These Amendments are offended 
only by intentional racial discrimination, and that is all that section 2 would tar-
get: voting requirements that are actually invidious or from which an invidious 
objective can reasonably be inferred. Section 2 would no longer reach the broader 
swath of governmental conduct, involving disparate impact alone, that does not 
permit this inference to be drawn.
334
 
Turning to the potential clash between section 2 and the equal protection 
principle of colorblindness, Inclusive Communities is again instructive. In it, the 
Court warned that “serious constitutional questions” would arise if disparate 
impact liability “were imposed solely on a showing of a statistical disparity.”
335
 
These concerns would be allayed, though, if the legal standard were “properly 
limited in key respects.”
336
 One such restriction is that “a disparate-impact claim 
 
330. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
331. At least according to the current Supreme Court. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
332. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 & n.15 (1977). 
333. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2511-12 
(2015). 
334. See Primus, supra note 217, at 1377 (concurring that “disparate impact doctrine is more likely 
to be” upheld if it is aimed at “[p]reventing intentional discrimination”). 
335. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522. 
336. Id. 
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that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a de-
fendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity.”
337
 Another “important and 
appropriate means of ensuring that disparate-impact liability is properly limited 




Based on these passages, section 2 would avoid excessive race consciousness 
if it employed the usual framework in vote denial cases. As required by the Court, 
a plaintiff would have to identify a particular electoral practice that produces a 
disparate impact in order to establish a prima facie case.
339
 Also consistent with 
the Court’s admonitions, a jurisdiction would be able to defend itself by showing 
that its practice is “necessary to achieve a valid interest.”
340
 Thanks to these “ad-
equate safeguards,” section 2 would not “cause race to be used and considered in 
a pervasive way” or “‘almost inexorably lead’ [jurisdictions] to use ‘numerical 
quotas.’”
341
 Section 2 would have these consequences only if it were violated by 
a naked racial disparity. It would not unduly racialize the electoral process if, 




i i i .  objections and responses 
This concludes the affirmative case for unifying disparate impact law: the 
usual framework (1) is applicable to section 2 vote denial claims, and it should 
be applied to them in order (2) to resolve doctrinal disputes and (3) to bolster 
section 2’s constitutionality. Next, I consider a number of legal and practical ob-
jections to this thesis. One counterargument is that section 2’s text and precedent 
 
337. Id. at 2523; see also id. (requiring a “robust causality requirement”). 
338. Id. at 2522; see also id. (adding that “[t]his step of the analysis . . . provides a defense against 
disparate-impact liability”). 
339. See supra Section II.C.1. 
340. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523; see supra Section II.C.6. 
341. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 
653 (1989)). 
342. See Bagenstos, supra note 217, at 1129 (agreeing that if the usual framework is used, then “any 
frontal constitutional assault on disparate-impact liability should fail”). Of course, this argu-
ment puts a great deal of weight on the 5-4 majority decision in Inclusive Communities, which 
was written by Justice Kennedy, who no longer serves on the Court. But the main dissent in 
Inclusive Communities did not question Justice Kennedy’s claim that the usual framework is 
constitutional; it merely disagreed that the FHA recognizes disparate impact discrimination. 
See 135 S. Ct. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting). Only Justice Thomas, in a solo dissent, contended 
that “[d]isparate-impact liability” is “a rule without a reason, or at least without a legitimate 
one,” and is thus constitutionally dubious. See id. at 2531 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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bar the usual framework’s extension to it. Another is that the usual framework 
would simply repeat the analysis that is already conducted when an electoral pol-
icy is challenged on constitutional grounds. And a third is that the prior record 
of the usual framework is so poor that every effort should be made not to expand 
its domain any further. These concerns cannot be dismissed lightly. But neither 
alone nor in tandem, in my view, do they lead to the conclusion that disparate 
impact law should not be unified after all. 
A. Text and Precedent 
The first objection is that standard legal sources do not support the usual 
framework’s use for section 2 vote denial claims. Section 2’s own language men-
tions neither a justification defense for jurisdictions nor an opportunity for 
plaintiffs to rebut this defense by introducing a less discriminatory alternative.
343
 
Nor does any Supreme Court decision about section 2 require these doctrinal 
features. To the contrary, the Court’s preeminent section 2 case, Thornburg v. 
Gingles, states that “[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral 
law . . . interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in 
the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and white voters.”
344
 Gingles adds that 
the Senate factors are “probative of a § 2 violation”
345
 and “elaborate[] on the 
nature of § 2 violations and on the proof required to establish these viola-
tions.”
346
 These comments are plainly more consistent with the courts’ two-part 
test than with the usual framework. Indeed, they largely explain the test’s ori-
gins: lacking authoritative guidance for vote denial (as opposed to vote dilution) 
claims, judges relied on the portions of Gingles that seemed generally applicable 
to all section 2 theories.
347
 
It is true, of course, that section 2’s language does not mandate the usual 
framework’s use. If it did, there would be little point to an article that merely 
echoed the textual command. But section 2 is equally silent regarding the courts’ 
two-part test. The need to show a practice’s interaction with social and historical 
discrimination and the relevance of the Senate factors—these points are present 
 
343. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018). 
344. 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986). 
345. Id. at 36. 
346. Id. at 43. 
347. See, e.g., Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366, 377-79 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(citing and discussing Gingles); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 243-46 (5th Cir. 2016) (en 
banc) (same); League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240-41 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (same); Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 550-51, 554 
(6th Cir. 2014), vacated as moot, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014) (same). 
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in Gingles, but they are nowhere to be found in section 2 itself. In fact, all the 
provision says about vote denial claims is that they are cognizable because they 
assert “a denial . . . of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or 
color.”
348
 Section 2 is entirely mute as to which legal standard should govern 




Based on precedent, moreover, an agnostic statute is no obstacle to the usual 
framework’s imposition. In Griggs, the Supreme Court famously unveiled the 
framework without even specifying from which part of Title VII it stemmed.
350
 
The Court’s reasoning was only slightly more textually bound in Smith v. City of 
Jackson,
351
 the 2005 case that extended the usual framework to the ADEA. Be-
cause the ADEA’s language is very similar to that of Title VII, the Court held, 
disparate impact claims must follow the same rules under both laws.
352
 The 
Court reprised this logic in Inclusive Communities, explaining that the FHA’s text, 
too, is “equivalent in function and purpose” to that of Title VII and the ADEA.
353
 
Because the FHA “refers to the consequences of actions and not just to the mind-
set of actors,” it “must be construed to encompass” the usual framework.
354
 
This line of argument is an even easier sell when it comes to section 2. Title 
VII, the ADEA, and the FHA are ambiguous as to whether they can be breached 
 
348. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a); see also supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing section 2’s 
coverage of vote denial claims). 
349. A more radical version of the textual argument is that section 2’s language is inconsistent with 
both the courts’ two-part test and the usual framework, because it requires liability to be im-
posed based on a disparate impact alone. This claim also wrongly infers from section 2’s silence 
about doctrinal elements beyond a disparate impact that these elements are precluded. The 
claim, furthermore, cannot be reconciled with the Court’s approach to racial vote dilution in 
Gingles and its progeny. This approach includes a host of factors (geographic compactness, 
racial polarization, and so on) that are nowhere to be found in the statutory text. See generally 
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, 
and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 404 (2012) (characterizing section 2 as a 
“common law statute” that courts develop with little reference to the provision’s language). 
350. The Court merely cited a pair of FHA subsections, without further comment, in its opinion’s 
first footnote. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.1 (1971); see also Tex. Dep’t 
of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2517 (2015) (observ-
ing that in Griggs, “[t]he Court did not quote or cite the full statute”). 
351. 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
352. See id. at 233 (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen Congress uses the same language in two statutes 
having similar purposes . . . it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to 
have the same meaning in both statutes.”). 
353. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2518; see also id. at 2519 (noting “the structure common to all 
three statutes” and “[t]his similarity in text and structure”). 
354. Id. at 2518. 
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without a showing of discriminatory intent.
355
 In Griggs, City of Jackson, and In-
clusive Communities, the Court therefore had to resolve this ambiguity first; only 
then could it rule that the usual framework would govern disparate impact 
claims in these areas.
356
 In contrast, there is no doubt that section 2 can be in-
fringed even in the absence of an invidious motive. The whole point of its 1982 
revision was to make this clear,
357
 and the provision now explicitly bans electoral 
practices that “result[] in” a race-based denial or abridgment of the franchise.
358
 
Accordingly, it would take the Court just one step, not two, to apply the usual 
framework to section 2. The Court would not have to puzzle over whether sec-
tion 2 recognizes disparate impact discrimination since it obviously does. In-
stead, the Court could skip ahead to holding that this form of discrimination, 
when it relates to voting, is regulated by the usual framework. 
As for the Court’s landmark decision in Gingles, it involved only vote dilu-
tion—indeed, only one kind of vote dilution: the use of multimember districts 
to submerge minority voters within a larger white population.
359
 Aware of the 
case’s limited scope, the Court stressed that it did not mean to address other 
section 2 issues. It had “no occasion to consider whether [its] standards . . . are 
fully pertinent” to claims against single-member districts.
360
 It also had “no oc-
casion to consider whether § 2 permits” challenges by minority groups that are 
too small to control their own districts.
361
 And the Court remarked that while 
the Senate factors are “pertinent to certain types of § 2 violations, particularly to 
vote dilution claims, other factors may also be relevant and may be consid-
ered.”
362
 “[S]ome Senate factors are more important to . . . vote-dilution 
 
355. More accurately, Title VII was ambiguous prior to its 1991 amendment. It now clearly recog-
nizes “unlawful employment practice[s] based on disparate impact.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A) (2018); see also supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text. 
356. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2518 (first examining whether “antidiscrimination 
laws . . . encompass disparate-impact claims” and only then explaining how “[d]isparate-im-
pact liability must be limited” under the usual framework). 
357. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 71 (1986) (“In amending § 2, Congress rejected 
the requirement . . . that § 2 plaintiffs must prove the discriminatory intent of state or local 
governments in adopting or maintaining the challenged electoral mechanism.”). 
358. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
359. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 42 (titling the opinion’s key section “Section 2 and Vote Dilution 
through Use of Multimember Districts”). 
360. Id. at 46-47 n.12. 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 45. 
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In light of Gingles’s circumspectness, it makes little sense to treat its dicta as 
gospel in other section 2 contexts. Gingles did not even try to answer every major 
vote dilution question. It certainly did not purport to specify a test for vote denial 
claims—challenges that barely registered with Congress when it amended sec-
tion 2 or with the Court when it decided Gingles.
364
 Gingles’s references to “in-
teract[ion] with social and historical conditions” and the “probative” Senate fac-
tors are thus best understood as a gloss on section 2’s brief text: a guide to the 
provision’s typical operation.
365
 What these snippets are not is precisely what the 
lower courts have wrongly made them: a legally enforceable standard for elec-
toral practices that allegedly deny (but do not dilute) the franchise. 
In any event, the tension between Gingles and the usual framework should 
not be overstated. Gingles discusses measures’ links with past and present dis-
crimination while the usual framework requires no such connection. But as 
noted above,
366
 these links are almost always present when policies cause racial 
disparities, even if they do not actually have to be proven. Likewise, neither Gin-
gles nor the Senate factors include a justification defense, though it is a crucial 
stage of the usual framework. But the defense is substantively quite similar to 
the Senate factor about the tenuousness of the government’s explanation. This 
factor could be modified to heighten further its resemblance to the defense and 
then made a more significant part of the doctrine.
367
 Notably, this adjustment 
would not conflict with Gingles, but rather would follow from its flexible view of 
the Senate factors. A revamped tenuousness factor would “also be relevant” and 
one that “may be considered.”
368
 It would become “more important to [vote de-




363. Id. at 48-49 n.15; see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 (1982) (noting that vote denial claims 
“would not necessarily involve the same factors” as vote dilution claims). 
364. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
365. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47. 
366. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text. 
367. See supra Section II.C.6. 
368. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45. 
369. Id. at 48 n.15. 
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B. Constitutional Convergence 
The next objection to the unification of disparate impact law is not that it is 
barred but rather that it is redundant. Under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, plaintiffs may dispute electoral practices that make it more difficult for 
them to vote. Courts considering such claims first “weigh ‘the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the [Constitu-
tion].’”
370
 The degree of judicial scrutiny then rises or falls along with the extent 
of the burden on the franchise. “[W]hen those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ 
restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest 
of compelling importance.’”
371
 “But when a state election law provision imposes 
only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ . . . ‘the State’s important reg-
ulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.”
372
 
The overlap between the usual framework and the constitutional inquiry 
arises after a prima facie case has been established in a disparate impact suit. At 
this point, assuming the jurisdiction mounts a justification defense, the key is-
sues under the usual framework are (1) whether the jurisdiction’s asserted inter-
est is substantial; and (2) whether the challenged policy is necessary to achieve 
this interest.
373
 Critically, these are the same issues that must be addressed in a 
constitutional case after a court determines the severity of a measure’s burden on 
the franchise. The court must next evaluate the strength of the jurisdiction’s in-
terest and the measure’s fit with this goal. Tailoring,
374
 in other words, is an in-
dispensable element of the analysis under both section 2 and the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. The same questions must be asked, and the same evidence 
considered, whether the claim is statutory or constitutional. 
The charge that the usual framework partly converges with the constitu-
tional inquiry cannot be wholly rebutted. The doctrines are similar in that they 
both rely on tailoring. Tailoring, though, is a ubiquitous feature of American 
 
370. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 
789 (1983)). 
371. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
372. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). 
373. See supra Section II.C.6. 
374. For the sake of brevity, I use “tailoring” to refer to both the evaluation of a jurisdiction’s inter-
ests and how closely the challenged policy serves these goals. 
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public law. As Richard Fallon observes, “it dominate[s] numerous fields of con-
stitutional law”
375
 because it offers a “solution to a generic problem”
376
: how to 
balance a valued good (like section 2’s aspiration of racial equality in voting, or 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ aim that the franchise be exercised 
freely) against countervailing state interests, of varying weight, that demand the 
good’s sacrifice. So it cannot be much of a strike against the usual framework 
that it employs this methodology. Given the methodology’s prevalence, it would 
be more of a surprise if it did not make an appearance in disparate impact law. 
If the usual framework were adopted, it would also not be the first time that 
the same facts could spawn suits under both section 2 and the Constitution. It is 
already black-letter law, with respect to any type of electoral practice, that it 
equally violates section 2
377
 and the Reconstruction Amendments
378
 if it was en-
acted with racially discriminatory intent.
379
 In the vote dilution context, too, at-
large elections and district plans may be invalid under both section 2 (if they fail 
the elaborate test created by Gingles and its progeny
380
) and the Reconstruction 
Amendments (if an invidious objective is inferred from the totality of circum-
stances
381
). Under the usual framework, then, vote denial law would be one 
more entry on this list: one more area where statutory and constitutional theo-
ries intersect. 
As a doctrinal matter, furthermore, this intersection would be quite limited. 
First, the usual framework and the constitutional inquiry have different triggers 
for their tailoring stages. Under the former, a prima facie case of a racially dis-
parate impact must be proven, while under the latter, a policy’s burden on the 
right to vote must be ascertained. Second, once the tailoring stage is reached, it 
 
375. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1275 (2007) (discussing 
strict scrutiny specifically rather than tailoring more generally). 
376. Id. at 1270. 
377. See, e.g., Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1520 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[A] plaintiff . . . may 
demonstrate a [section 2] violation by proving either: (1) the subjective discriminatory motive 
of legislators or other relevant officials; or (2) [discriminatory results].”). 
378. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61-65 (1980) (discussing the Fifteenth Amend-
ment); id. at 65-80 (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment). 
379. The same is true with respect to public employees’ claims of intentional racial discrimination. 
“[T]he law of equal protection” has “the same substantive content as Title VII’s prohibition 
on disparate treatment.” Primus, supra note 217, at 1354. 
380. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-51 (1986) (setting forth the preconditions for lia-
bility now known as the “Gingles prongs”). 
381. For an example of an illicit motive being inferred in the absence of smoking-gun evidence, see 
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622-28 (1982). 
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proceeds differently under each doctrine. Under the usual framework, the ques-
tion is always the same: is the measure necessary to achieve a substantial inter-
est? But under the Constitution, judicial review can vary from highly deferential 
(if the burden on the franchise is light) to very stringent (if the burden is se-
vere).
382
 And third, after the tailoring stage concludes, the plaintiff may still offer 
a less discriminatory alternative under the usual framework. The constitutional 
inquiry, though, includes no opportunity for a surrebuttal. 
It is not hard to see how these doctrinal distinctions could be consequential. 
Suppose a plaintiff in a vote denial case cannot show a significant racial disparity 
or cannot link it to a particular electoral practice.
383
 Then the plaintiff loses under 
the usual framework before its tailoring stage even begins. If the same policy is 
challenged under the Constitution, in contrast, the tailoring stage cannot be 
avoided. Whether the measure’s burden on the franchise is light or heavy, a court 
will have to assess the importance of the interest the provision serves and how 
well it serves it. Tailoring is thus a necessary component of the constitutional 
inquiry but only a contingent part of the usual framework. 
Or take a practice that causes a large racial disparity but does not make it 
much more difficult to vote. (Photo ID requirements for voting arguably fit in 
this category. Some studies find sizeable differences in valid photo ID possession 
by race,
384
 while in the Supreme Court’s view, the requirements’ burdens on the 
franchise are “neither so serious nor so frequent.”
385
) Under the usual frame-
work, a prima facie case can typically be established against this sort of policy, 
meaning that for it to be upheld, it must be necessary to achieve a substantial 
interest. Under the Constitution, on the other hand, the level of scrutiny is much 
lower. Because the law’s burden is light, it need only have some relation to a le-
gitimate goal to be sustained. Again, then, the usual framework and the consti-
tutional inquiry diverge despite the tailoring stage they nominally share. 
C. Prior Record 
The last counterargument I address is more historical than legal. It is that 
the usual framework has been so disappointing in the areas where it has already 
 
382. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976) (observing that, under Title VII, the justi-
fication defense “involves a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seem-
ingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Consti-
tution” when rational basis review is applied). 
383. See supra Sections II.C.1, II.C.2 (discussing these requirements). 
384. See, e.g., Hopkins et al., supra note 2, at 83 (summarizing eleven such studies). 
385. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197 (2008). 
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been tried that it should not be exported to any new field. Why are (some) schol-
ars unhappy with the usual framework? Plaintiffs’ low success rates in disparate 
impact claims brought pursuant to it are the main explanation. As summarized 
earlier, these rates are 20% to 25% under Title VII,
386
 less than 20% under the 
FHA,
387
 and less than 15% under Title VI.
388
 The recurring defeats are com-
pounded by the limited numbers of disparate impact claims that are filed in the 
first place. Under Title VII, there has only been a “small volume of . . . disparate 
impact litigation in recent years,”
389
 while under the FHA and Title VI, only a 
few dozen disparate impact cases have ever been decided at the appellate level.
390
 
Due to these sobering statistics, several academics have reached gloomy con-
clusions about the usual framework’s utility. For instance, Selmi writes (in an 
article titled Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?) that “there has been no 
area where [Title VII’s] disparate impact theory has proved transformative or 
even particularly successful.”
391
 Similarly, Abernathy comments (in Legal Real-
ism and the Failure of the “Effects” Test for Discrimination) that Title VI’s “effects 
test . . . was a concept that judges profoundly distrusted and were unable or un-
prepared to implement.”
392
 Neither Selmi nor Abernathy has anything to say 
about section 2. But their implicit message is clear: Be careful what you wish for. 
Do not put your faith in a legal standard that has brought nothing but tears in 
other domains. 
To begin with, lawsuits’ numbers and success rates are a poor guide to a legal 
theory’s social value. A theory could be symbolically significant even if it gener-
ates few cases and fewer plaintiff victories. As Richard Primus has remarked 
about the usual framework in the Title VII context, “[I]t does preserve some 
awareness that existing racial hierarchies are products of past discrimination and 
that a level-playing-field approach today could help those hierarchies perpetuate 
 
386. See Selmi, supra note 14, at 738-39. 
387. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 14, at 393. 
388. See Abernathy, supra note 188, at 300-11. 
389. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 
587 (2003). 
390. See Abernathy, supra note 188, at 312; Seicshnaydre, supra note 14, at 391-92. 
391. Selmi, supra note 14, at 753 (but excepting cases about employment tests from this judgment). 
392. Abernathy, supra note 188, at 273; see also, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and 
the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) (“Disparate impact doctrine 
[under Title VII] has been in a massive decline over the past few decades.”); Olatunde C.A. 
Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 396 (2007) (noting “judicial concerns about 
whether [the usual framework in Title VI cases] would require the judiciary to broadly re-
structure social institutions”). 




 Additionally, a theory might be characterized by in-
frequent and ineffective litigation because it has already managed to change de-
fendants’ behavior. This seems to be at least part of the Title VII story. In George 
Rutherglen’s words, “The failure of the theory of disparate impact as a vehicle 
for continued litigation can . . . be attributed . . . to its past successes.”
394
 It pre-
viously “caus[ed] employers to abandon facially neutral employment practices, 
such as general aptitude tests,” and “encourag[ed] employers to adopt affirma-
tive action plans to eliminate the most obvious forms of disparate impact.”
395
 
An equivalent dynamic is plausible in vote denial law.
396
 Say the usual frame-
work is adopted and that plaintiffs then use it to prevail in a series of suits against 
photo ID requirements for voting. Next, assume that jurisdictions respond ei-
ther by abandoning these requirements or by passing less onerous provisions 
(like ones that waive the need to show ID for citizens who sign hardship affida-
vits). Finally, imagine that plaintiffs challenge few of these next-generation laws 
and often lose when they do sue. Section 2 would then exhibit the same features 
as Title VII, the FHA, and Title VI: namely, a low volume of litigation and a 
depressed win rate. Yet no one would infer from this data that section 2 is a “mis-
take” (Selmi) or a “failure” (Abernathy). The right conclusion, rather, would be 
that section 2 has succeeded in its mission. It has ended (or at least alleviated) 
practices responsible for unjustified racial disparities, leaving scarcer and less 




393. Primus, supra note 389, at 587; see also, e.g., Jolls, supra note 302, at 671 (“[T]he simple number 
of disparate impact claims is not a good measure of their underlying importance.”). 
394. George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 139 (1995). 
395. Id. at 136-37. Congress viewed the usual framework even more sunnily when it amended Title 
VII in 1991. According to the Senate report, “the Griggs decision has had an extraordinarily 
positive impact on the American workplace.” S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 15 (1990). “In hundreds 
of cases, federal courts have struck down unnecessary barriers to the full participation of mi-
norities and women in the workplace, and employers have voluntarily eliminated discrimina-
tory practices in countless other instances.” Id.; see also, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 
622 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Federal trial and appellate courts applied Griggs and 
Albemarle to disallow a host of hiring and promotion practices . . . .”). 
396. Of course, this dynamic would be even more potent if the underlying legal standard were 
easier to satisfy (as the courts’ two-part test is compared to the usual framework). My point, 
though, is that the dynamic is still strong even under the usual framework, as evidenced by a 
less jaundiced appraisal of the record of Title VII and the FHA. 
397. Interestingly, there is some evidence that this dynamic is occurring even without the usual 
framework’s adoption. After a series of photo ID requirements were struck down on section 
2 grounds, some states responded by passing less stringent provisions. These measures have 
largely been upheld after they, in turn, were challenged. See, e.g., Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elec-
tions, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016) (sustaining Virginia’s photo ID law); Greater Birmingham 
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Another response to the pessimism of Selmi, Abernathy, and their ilk high-
lights the differences rather than the commonalities between voting and the ar-
eas already governed by the usual framework. As discussed above, voting is a 
nonmarket good regulated exclusively by the state.
398
 The strongest justification 
for racial disparities in employment and housing—private actors’ pursuit of 
profit—therefore cannot be asserted in defense of electoral practices. Voting is 
also a nonrivalrous good whose consumption by one citizen does not affect its 
use by others.
399
 The invalidation of franchise restrictions thus yields no inno-
cent victims: no nonminorities are denied the ballot so minorities may vote in-
stead. Both of these points suggest that, under the usual framework, outcomes 
could be quite different in section 2 cases from those in Title VII and FHA suits. 
Plaintiffs might have more luck because defendants would be unable to raise 
their most potent objection and a zero-sum calculus would not apply to court-
ordered relief. 
Lastly, what if Selmi, Abernathy, and the other skeptics are right? If the usual 
framework has dashed its backers’ hopes in other fields, and if it would also be 
a letdown in the vote denial context, then should it not be extended to section 2? 
This is admittedly an unpleasant scenario: one where the usual framework nei-
ther promotes racial equality in voting, nor unearths discriminatory motives, nor 
removes bottlenecks to political participation.
400
 But even in this case, I think 
there is no alternative to the usual framework’s adoption. If I am correct that the 
courts’ two-part test collapses into a single requirement of a racial disparity,
401
 
then the test is simply not a viable option. Under current constitutional law, 
Congress lacks the authority to impose such a requirement, and the judiciary 
cannot employ it either without transgressing the colorblindness principle.
402
 
Nor is any other legal standard feasible unless it shares the usual framework’s 
“adequate safeguards,” in particular its justification defense.
403
 These doctrinal 
protections, the Supreme Court’s decisions make clear, are matters of constitu-
tional necessity, not legislative grace. 
I should reiterate that my own appraisal of the usual framework is rosier than 
Selmi’s or Abernathy’s. I think it has produced real improvements in employ-
ment and housing practices—and that it would be even more effective in vote 
 
Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (sustaining Alabama’s photo ID 
law). 
398. See supra Section II.B.3. 
399. See id. 
400. See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the various theories of disparate impact law). 
401. See supra Section I.D. 
402. See id. 
403. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 
(2015). 
the yale law journal 128:1566  2019 
1636 
denial cases. This more optimistic perspective is the primary reason the usual 
framework’s past performance does not deter me from recommending its expan-
sion. My secondary reason, though, is that the usual framework’s record is ulti-
mately immaterial. Even if it has been the fiasco alleged by its critics, it is, at 
present, the only doctrinal structure available for disparate impact law. 
iv.  applications 
The objections to extending the usual framework to section 2 vote denial 
claims are therefore unconvincing. Neither the statutory text nor Gingles calls for 
the usual framework’s use—but the text does not endorse any other approach 
either, and as a vote dilution case, Gingles sheds little light on vote denial issues. 
The usual framework shares a tailoring stage with the constitutional analysis of 
policies that burden the franchise—but this overlap is neither unusual nor very 
extensive given the doctrines’ considerable differences. And the usual framework 
may not have been a rousing success in other areas—but this judgment is debat-
able, potentially inapplicable to section 2, and irrelevant in the end due to the 
lack of viable alternatives. 
Since the objections do not persuade, it is natural to ask what the unification 
of disparate impact law would mean for particular electoral measures. Could 
they be sensibly evaluated under the usual framework? If so, what would this 
evaluation look like—what evidence would be presented to prove which points? 
In this Part, I discuss the usual framework’s application to three common prac-
tices: photo ID requirements for voting, cutbacks to early voting, and all-mail 
voting. I examine these laws not only because they are familiar but also because 
each one is illustrative of a different kind of electoral policy. A photo ID require-
ment is an example of a new franchise restriction: a barrier to voting that did not 
previously exist. A cutback to early voting is a reversal of a prior franchise expan-
sion: a hardening of a regime that had earlier been softened. And all-mail voting 




The theme of the ensuing analysis is the flexibility of the usual framework. 
It can be used, without restrictions or caveats, to assess all three types of electoral 
measures. Because my focus is on how the usual framework would operate in a 
range of settings, I do not comment on what its outcome might be in any specific 
 
404. The missing fourth category is a reversal of a prior franchise restriction. Few recent laws fall 
into this category. Laws in this category also raise section 2 issues only in the unlikely event 
that the prior restriction benefited minority citizens (meaning that its repeal would advantage 
nonminority citizens). 
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case. No such conclusion could be generally valid anyway, due to the many dif-
ferences that exist among jurisdictions and their voting practices. The usual 
framework’s verdict, in other words, is inherently fact dependent, and the nec-
essary facts cannot all be gathered ex ante.
405
 
A. Photo ID Requirements 
Starting with photo ID requirements, they are currently in effect in seventeen 
states.
406
 Seven of these states categorically refuse to count ballots cast by voters 
lacking proper IDs, while the other ten offer some sort of failsafe: an opportunity 
to sign an affidavit of identity, for instance, or a chance to submit a provisional 
ballot that is eventually counted if poll workers determine that the voter is eligi-
ble and registered.
407
 To establish a prima facie case under the usual framework, 
a section 2 plaintiff challenging one of these provisions would have to show that 
its selection rate for minorities is significantly lower than its selection rate for 
nonminorities. Selection rate, here, means the proportion of otherwise-eligible 
citizens who possess a valid ID (or who are able to vote, despite lacking one, due 
to a failsafe). These are the people who are “selected” for the benefit of voting—
the ones, that is, who are not denied the franchise because of their inability to 
comply with the photo ID requirement. 
The requirement’s minority and nonminority selection rates may be esti-
mated through a survey. Otherwise-eligible citizens in the jurisdiction may 
simply be asked if they have a proper ID (or are able to vote due to a failsafe).
408
 
The requirement’s selection rates may also be determined using governmental 
records. Databases of registered voters and of people with valid IDs may be 
merged, thus revealing the shares of registered voters, by race, who are able to 
 
405. One more note: When analyzing the usual framework’s applications in this Part, I do not cite 
to my earlier discussion of the framework’s doctrinal features. See supra Sections II.A, II.C. I 
trust that the reader recalls these features and does not need to be repeatedly reminded of 
them. 
406. See Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS-
LATURES (Oct. 31, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id
.aspx [https://perma.cc/7MWN-VBJD]. 
407. See id. Note that in states with “strict” photo ID requirements, voters may cast provisional 
ballots, but these ballots are counted only if voters manage to obtain valid IDs within the 
specified timeframe. 
408. For examples of surveys being used in section 2 suits about photo ID requirements, see Brake-
bill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-cv-008, 2018 WL 1612190, at *2-3 (D.N.D. Apr. 3, 2018); Greater Bir-
mingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1269 (N.D. Ala. 2018); and Frank v. Walker, 
17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 871-72 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). 




 However the selection rates are ascertained, the dif-
ference between them must be statistically significant in order for the plaintiff to 
make out a prima facie case.
410
 It would also be helpful to the plaintiff if the 
difference was substantively large—for example, if the minority selection rate 
was less than four-fifths of the nonminority selection rate.
411
 
Note that while the photo ID requirement’s selection rates are crucial under 
the usual framework, minority and nonminority turnout rates are irrelevant. The 
plaintiff need not demonstrate a difference in turnout by race, and the jurisdic-
tion may not defend itself by arguing that minority and nonminority citizens 
vote in similar proportions. Note also that, if there is a significant racial differ-
ence between the photo ID requirement’s selection rates, the reason for the dif-
ference is immaterial. The plaintiff need not prove that the gap arose because of 
the requirement’s interaction with social and historical discrimination, and it is 
no defense for the jurisdiction that minority citizens’ subjective preferences 
might explain the gap. 
If a prima facie case is set forth, the next step would be for the jurisdiction, 
if it wishes, to assert a justification defense. The prevention of voter-imperson-
ation fraud is the state interest most often invoked on behalf of photo ID require-
ments,
412
 though additional cited goals include following the lead of other states  
 
 
409. For examples of database matching being used in section 2 suits about photo ID requirements, 
see Greater Birmingham Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 1268-70; Lee v. Virginia State Bd. of Elec-
tions, 188 F. Supp. 3d 577, 598-99 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016); North Carolina 
State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 364-65 (M.D.N.C.), rev’d, 831 
F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016); and Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 661-62 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
410. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2018) (requiring “differences in selection rate” that “are sig-
nificant in both statistical and practical terms”). 
411. My review of relevant decisions suggests that the difference between photo ID requirements’ 
minority and nonminority selection rates is frequently statistically significant but that the mi-
nority selection rate is rarely less than four-fifths of the nonminority selection rate. See, e.g., 
Brakebill, 2018 WL 1612190, at *2 (Native American selection rate of 81% and non-Native 
American selection rate of 88%); Greater Birmingham Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 1269 (black 
selection rate of 98% and white selection rate of 99%); Lee, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 599 (black 
selection rate of 94-95% and white selection rate of 96-97%); McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 365 
(black selection rate of 94% and white selection rate of 98%); Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 661 
(Latino selection rate of 94% and non-Latino selection rate of 96%); Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 
872 (Latino selection rate of 85%, black selection rate of 87%, and white selection rate of 93%). 
412. For examples of fraud prevention being asserted as a state interest in section 2 suits about 
photo ID requirements, see Greater Birmingham Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 1277-78; 
McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 440-45; Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 653; and Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 
847-50. 
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with such provisions, stopping undocumented immigrants from voting, and 
bolstering voter confidence.
413
 Any interest named by the jurisdiction must be 
substantial in order to be recognized. Voter-impersonation fraud (the only kind 
a photo ID requirement could thwart) must therefore be a real problem;
414
 legal 
consistency with other states must be a genuine concern; a nontrivial number of 
undocumented immigrants must seek to vote; and/or voter confidence in the 
electoral system must be worrisomely low. It is also the jurisdiction’s obligation 
to make these showings. It bears the burden of introducing probative evidence 
and convincing the court of the weight of its interests. 
The jurisdiction bears the further burden of establishing that its photo ID 
requirement is necessary to achieve its objectives. The requirement must, in fact, 
deter would-be voter impersonators from carrying out their fraud, yield legal 
harmony with other states, dissuade undocumented immigrants from going to 
the polls, and/or improve voters’ faith in elections. There must also be no obvi-
ous alternative that would be equivalently effective. If one exists, then the photo 




Lastly, if the jurisdiction successfully mounts a justification defense, the 
plaintiff may canvass other options more exhaustively and try to identify a policy 
that serves the jurisdiction’s interests as well—but without causing as large a 
racial disparity. One substitute for a conventional photo ID requirement is such 
 
413. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 262-64 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (noting these aims); see 
also Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 192-94 (2008) (also citing election 
modernization as a goal). 
414. The evidence is mostly undisputed that voter-impersonation fraud is extremely rare. Even 
courts upholding photo ID requirements have conceded this point. See, e.g., Greater Birming-
ham Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 1273 (“[T]here is a lack of evidence of any significant in-
person voter fraud in Alabama . . . .”); Lee, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 608-09 (“[S]tatistics reveal few 
convictions nationally for voter impersonation fraud . . . .”); McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 441 
(“[T]here was no evidence of voter impersonation fraud in North Carolina.”). 
415. The best example of a court analyzing the necessity of a photo ID requirement in a section 2 
case is the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Veasey, 830 F.3d 216. The court found that Texas’s 
law had a “dubious connection” with fraud prevention because it “pushed more vulnerable 
elderly voters away from in-person voting—a form of voting with little proven incidence of 
fraud—and toward mail-in voting, which . . . is far more vulnerable to fraud.” Id. at 263. The 
court also observed that while Texas “claimed to model its law after those from” other states, 
it “rejected many ameliorative amendments that would have brought [its law] in line with 
those states’ voter ID laws.” Id. The court further noted that Texas’s law “would not prevent 
noncitizens from voting, since noncitizens can legally obtain a Texas driver’s license or con-
cealed handgun license, two forms of [valid] ID.” Id. And in the court’s view, not only was 
there “‘no credible evidence’” that Texas’s law would “increase public confidence in elections,” 
but witness testimony suggested that the law’s implementation “might actually undermine 
voter confidence.” Id. (quoting Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 655 (S.D. Tex. 2014)). 
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a law paired with the free and automatic provision of photo IDs to all eligible 
voters in the state. If everyone entitled to vote possessed a valid ID, then a photo 
ID requirement could no longer have different minority and nonminority selec-
tion rates.
416
 Another possibility is taking and storing people’s photos when they 
register to vote or go to the polls. These photos (rather than ones on IDs) could 
then be used to prevent voter-impersonation fraud. One more idea (already used 
by several states
417
) is adding a failsafe to a photo ID requirement. If the failsafe 
allowed eligible and registered voters to cast ballots even if they lacked proper 
IDs, it could eliminate (or at least mitigate) any disparate racial impact. 
Proof of the availability of one of these less discriminatory alternatives would 
result in a judgment for the plaintiff. A plaintiff victory, in turn, would typically 
result in the invalidation of the photo ID requirement (whether the win occurred 
at the final stage of the usual framework or earlier in the process). In general, the 
court would not attempt to revise the requirement in order to reduce its racially 
disparate effect. The court would simply deem the provision a violation of sec-
tion 2. 
B. Early-Voting Cutbacks 
Turning to cutbacks to early voting, they have been enacted by seven states 
since 2010.
418
 All of these cutbacks have reduced the number of days prior to an 
election in which early voting is offered. Some of the cutbacks have also limited 
the number of locations in which early voting may take place
419
 or eliminated 
citizens’ ability simultaneously to register and then to vote early.
420
 To make out 
a prima facie case under the usual framework, a section 2 plaintiff disputing one 
of these laws would have to show that, prior to the cutback, minority citizens 
voted early at a significantly higher rate than nonminority citizens. This racial 
difference in early voting under the previous system would suggest that minority  
 
 
416. For a similar idea, proposing the pairing of a photo ID requirement with automatic voter 
registration, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 99-105 (2014). 
417. See Underhill, supra note 406. 
418. See New Voting Restrictions, supra note 1. 
419. See One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 931 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (discussing Wis-
consin’s policy that each municipality offer early voting in only one location). 
420. See Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 812 (S.D. Ohio) 
(discussing Ohio’s elimination of the “Golden Week” during which voters could simultane-
ously register and vote early), vacated as moot, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 
1, 2014). 
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citizens would be comparatively disadvantaged by the new policy. That is, the 
new policy’s minority and nonminority selection rates likely would not be as fa-
vorable for minority citizens as those of the old one.
421
 
These selection rates (like those of a photo ID requirement) may be esti-
mated in at least two ways. Minority and nonminority citizens may be asked, via 
a survey, if they cast their ballots early, by mail, on Election Day itself, or not at 
all.
422
 Governmental records of voter participation may also be consulted.
423
 
These records have the advantage that they often track when exactly voters cast 
 
421. Of course, if data are available about the new policy (because the section 2 suit is brought after 
the cutback has gone into effect), then no speculation is necessary regarding the new policy’s 
effects: its minority and nonminority selection rates can be compared directly to those of the 
old policy. Additionally, while the comparison between the old and new laws is explicit here, 
it was implicit in the above discussion of photo ID requirements. See supra Section IV.A. In 
the absence of a photo ID requirement, the minority and nonminority selection rates are both 
100% with respect to voter identification. This is the baseline against which the challenged 
provision’s selection rates are tacitly compared. Furthermore, the comparison between the old 
and new laws is not identical to the retrogression inquiry under section 5 of the VRA. That 
inquiry focuses “solely on voting opportunities enjoyed by minorities, and whether those op-
portunities would be reduced under the proposed law,” while the section 2 analysis examines 
“whether minorities enjoy less opportunity to vote as compared to other voters.” Husted, 768 F.3d 
at 558. 
Lastly, one might argue that, under the usual framework, only the new law’s minority 
and nonminority selection rates matter—that is, that the status quo ante is irrelevant. I think 
this is not the best reading of the usual framework’s particularity requirement. The specific 
provision being challenged in these cases is the cutback to early voting, not the new early-
voting policy alone, stripped of its historical context. Cf. Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jef-
ferson Cty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 377 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
“it is possible to bring [FHA] disparate-impact challenges to withdrawals” from previous de-
fendant policies); Muhammad v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 52 F. Supp. 3d 468, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 
2014) (recognizing a Title VII disparate impact challenge to a “narrow change in [uniform] 
policy” rather than the “broad requirement that bus operators wear a uniform”). Moreover, if 
the old law’s selection rates were immaterial, then no voting restriction could be disputed 
under section 2 if its new selection rates revealed an advantage for minority citizens. It would 
be beside the point that minority citizens previously benefited to a greater extent and then had 
this edge significantly reduced. In the absence of precedent compelling this result under the 
usual framework, there seems to be no good reason to insist on it in the vote denial context. 
Cf. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 334 (2000) (noting that section 2 cases may 
involve electoral “changes” in addition to “the status quo itself”); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 
n.117 (1982) (stating that liability under section 2 is more likely “[i]f the procedure markedly 
departs from past practices”). 
422. For an example of a survey being used in a section 2 suit about an early-voting cutback, see 
Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 830. 
423. For examples of governmental records being used in section 2 suits about early-voting cut-
backs, see North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 384-
85 (M.D.N.C.), rev’d, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016); and Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 828-30. 
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their early ballots; this is helpful in predicting the effects of reductions to (rather 
than abolitions of) early voting.
424
 The records sometimes have the drawback, 
though, of not listing the race of each voter; in this case, the race may be inferred 
based on the voter’s name or (in racially homogeneous areas) place of resi-
dence.
425
 However the selection rates are calculated, the gap between them must 
be worse for minority citizens under the new regime than under the old. And 
worse (again as in the photo ID context) means a difference that is at least sta-
tistically significant and preferably substantively large too.
426
 
If the plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case, the burden would then shift to 
the jurisdiction to prove that its early-voting cutback is necessary to achieve a 
substantial interest. The only rationales that have been advanced for cutbacks, to 
date, are the related ones of saving money and allocating limited resources to 
tasks other than administering early voting.
427
 For these explanations to pass 
muster, the jurisdiction must convince the court that they are weighty: that 
money is indeed tight and that election officials are, in fact, harried. The juris-
diction must also demonstrate that restricting early voting is crucial to the reali-
zation of these goals. The cutback must save sizeable sums and enable employees 
to do their jobs considerably more efficiently, and there must be no other way to 




424. See, e.g., McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 384-85 (analyzing voter participation “when broken down 
by the first seven days of early voting”). 
425. See, e.g., Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 828-30 (using “three standard ecological inference tech-
niques to draw inferences about the [early voting] rates of blacks and whites in Ohio” (quot-
ing Expert Rebuttal Declaration of Dr. Daniel A. Smith at 2, Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (No. 
14-cv-404), ECF No. 53-11)). 
426. My review of relevant decisions suggests that early-voting cutbacks tend to have an adverse 
effect on minority citizens that is both statistically significant and substantively large. See, e.g., 
McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 384 n.74 (finding that more than 60% of black voters in North 
Carolina voted early in 2008 and 2012, compared to less than 50% of white voters); Husted, 43 
F. Supp. 3d at 829 (finding that about 20% of black voters in Ohio voted early in 2012, com-
pared to less than 10% of white voters). 
427. See, e.g., One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 933 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (noting 
Wisconsin’s arguments that reducing early voting would “allow the state to conduct uniform, 
orderly elections,” give election officials “more time for other tasks,” and “save[] money”); see 
also McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 445-47 (citing similar arguments by North Carolina); Husted, 
43 F. Supp. 3d at 844-46 (citing Ohio’s antifraud and efficiency arguments). 
428. Courts have tended to doubt that early-voting cutbacks would yield significant improvements 
in cost or efficiency. See, e.g., One Wis. Inst., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 934 (expressing skepticism that 
“[a]lleviating the workload for clerks could be sufficient reason to limit the hours for in-per-
son absentee voting”); Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 845 (“[N]othing in the record . . . demon-
strate[s] that the old system created undue or burdensome costs.”). But see McCrory, 182 F. 
Supp. 3d at 446 (pointing out that “by reallocating the resources devoted to the first seven 
disparate impact, unified law 
1643 
If the jurisdiction makes these showings to the court’s satisfaction, the plain-
tiff would have a final opportunity to demonstrate that a comparably effective 
but less discriminatory alternative does actually exist. The plaintiff might argue 
that if the number of early-voting days was reduced, but more early-voting sites 
were opened for longer hours each day, then minority citizens would not be as 
disadvantaged while the jurisdiction would retain most of its scarce resources.
429
 
Or, switching these variables into another configuration, the plaintiff might rec-
ommend that the number of early-voting days be kept constant but with fewer 
early-voting sites open for shorter hours each day. If either of these options (or 
another proposal) would be similarly efficient while generating a smaller racial 
disparity, then the plaintiff would prevail. And if the plaintiff won, of course, the 
remedy would be the nullification of the jurisdiction’s early-voting cutback. 
C. All-Mail Voting 
All-mail voting is the last policy I consider to illustrate the flexibility of the 
usual framework. Twenty-two states conduct at least some elections by mail, 
meaning every registered voter is sent a ballot that the voter may then complete 
and return by mail during a specified period.
430
 Three states use all-mail voting 
for all of their elections.
431
 Preliminarily, certain observers claim that franchise 
expansions are beyond the scope of section 2 vote denial suits. A Fifth Circuit 
judge, for instance, has stressed the “difference between making voting harder in 
 
days of early voting,” North Carolina’s law “provides for more polling places rather than 
fewer” and “establishes longer, more convenient hours of early voting”). 
It is also relevant in a cutback case if, until recently, the state did provide more opportu-
nities for early voting. “[I]f a jurisdiction has successfully run an extended early voting pe-
riod . . . this fact will tend to undercut arguments that the burdens a more restrictive system 
imposes on minority voters are the unavoidable cost of pursuing the jurisdiction’s other per-
missible goals.” Karlan, supra note 8, at 782. 
429. This is essentially the regime that North Carolina instituted in 2013 (at least according to the 
district court’s decision about the state’s omnibus law). See McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 446. 
As in this case, a jurisdiction’s past or ongoing practice is one place to which a plaintiff may 
turn for data. Other jurisdictions’ records may also illuminate reasonable alternatives. 
430. See Dylan Lynch, All-Mail Elections, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 15, 2018), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/all-mail-elections.aspx [https://perma.cc
/YBU9-JDXE]. All-mail states still provide some opportunities for in-person voting before 
and on Election Day. 
431. These are Colorado, Oregon, and Washington. See id. 
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ways that . . . disproportionately burden minorities and making voting easier in 
ways that may not benefit all demographics equally.”
432
 
I think this position is untenable. In the extreme case, suppose a jurisdiction 
passes a law that facilitates voting only for nonminority citizens. Perhaps non-
minority citizens get an extra week to vote early, or may vote without displaying 
a photo ID, or may bypass the line at the polling place. Everyone presumably 
agrees that such a measure could be challenged under section 2.
433
 Even if the 
law does not affect the absolute position of minority citizens, it still produces a 
racial disparity by worsening their relative position vis-à-vis nonminority citi-
zens. The same logic holds for less dramatic hypotheticals. A facially neutral stat-
ute, too, may benefit nonminority citizens to a greater extent than minority citi-
zens, thus causing a disparate impact. That the race-neutral policy does not harm 
minority citizens, in absolute terms, is beside the point. The policy’s minority 
and nonminority selection rates are still less favorable for minority citizens than 
the status quo ante.
434
 
Assuming all-mail voting is subject to section 2 attack, the first step under 
the usual framework would be for the plaintiff to prove that the law significantly 
disadvantages minority citizens. The law does so if it boosts nonminority partic-
ipation by considerably more than it raises minority involvement.
435
 In this case, 
the minority selection rate is substantially lower compared to the nonminority 
selection rate under all-mail voting than it was under the previous regime.
436
 
This scenario is plausible because minority citizens are less likely to have perma-
 
432. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 279 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Higginson, J., concurring); see 
also Karlan, supra note 8, at 787 n.128 (“[E]xpansions of the franchise to constitutionally eli-
gible citizens cannot, in themselves, impair any constitutional right of other citizens.”). 
433. Of course, such a measure could also be challenged under the Constitution due to its racially 
discriminatory intent. 
434. This is a good example of a law that would not be retrogressive under section 5 of the VRA 
but that could nevertheless be challenged under section 2. See supra note 421 and accompany-
ing text. For a scholar agreeing with my view that section 2 applies to franchise expansions, 
see Pershing, supra note 60, at 1174 (“For purposes of determining inequalities of access under 
section 2, a convenience or benefit to voting should be no different from a burden or other 
imposition on that activity.”). For a case striking down a franchise expansion on section 2 
grounds, see Mississippi State Chapter, Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 
1987) (invalidating a relaxation of Mississippi’s dual registration system because, even as 
amended, it remained racially discriminatory). 
435. Note that voter turnout is the concept of interest here because that is what mail-in voting 
directly affects. When citizens submit ballots by mail, they necessarily turn out to vote. 
436. See supra note 421 (discussing the need to compare the new policy’s selection rates with those 
of the old policy). 
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nent addresses than nonminority citizens, more apt to live in areas with incon-
sistent mail delivery, and more prone not to return mail they receive.
437
 These 
factors need not be documented by the plaintiff since the reason for the racial 
disparity is irrelevant. But they help explain why a practice as seemingly innoc-
uous as all-mail voting could raise section 2 concerns. 
Second, the jurisdiction would have the chance to present a justification de-
fense. All-mail voting is most often endorsed on the grounds that it increases 
voter turnout and allows most or all polling locations to be shuttered.
438
 The 
jurisdiction must therefore show that voter participation and resource preserva-
tion are important ends. The jurisdiction must also establish a strong link be-
tween these ends and all-mail voting. It must clearly lift voter turnout and save 




And third, the plaintiff would be able to offer an equivalently effective but 
less discriminatory alternative. Mostly-mail (not all-mail) voting might be one 
such policy. If citizens could vote by mail or in person at a reasonable number of 
polling sites, then the racial disparity of all-mail voting could be reduced at a 
relatively low cost.
440
 Another possibility is combining all-mail voting with tar-
geted outreach to minority citizens and (for minorities who speak limited Eng-
lish) ballot instructions in additional languages.
441
 These supplements could 
also lessen the disparate impact of all-mail voting at an affordable price. A final 
 
437. See, e.g., Thad Kousser & Megan Mullin, Does Voting by Mail Increase Participation? Using 
Matching to Analyze a Natural Experiment, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 428, 440 n.13 (2007) (finding that 
under all-mail voting in Oregon, “[p]articipation was significantly lower in precincts with 
more Hispanic, Asian, black, or multiethnicity residents”). 
438. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 430 (noting “possible advantages” for all-mail voting, including 
“turnout” and “financial savings”). 
439. The empirical evidence is ambiguous as to whether all-mail voting increases voter turnout. 
See, e.g., Paul Gronke & Peter Miller, Voting by Mail and Turnout in Oregon: Revisiting Southwell 
and Burchett, 40 AM. POL. RES. 976, 984-87 (2012) (finding higher turnout under all-mail vot-
ing in Oregon in special but not in primary or general elections); Priscilla L. Southwell, An-
alysis of the Turnout Effects of Vote by Mail Elections, 1980-2007, 46 SOC. SCI. J. 211, 213-15 (2009) 
(same, though with a small bump in general election turnout); Priscilla L. Southwell & Justin 
I. Burchett, The Effect of All-Mail Elections on Voter Turnout, 28 AM. POL. Q. 72 (2000) (finding 
a ten-percentage-point increase in participation among Oregon voters based on three all-mail 
elections in 1995 and 1996). 
440. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 430 (noting that, in Colorado, “voters can choose to cast a ballot at 
an in-person vote center during the early voting period or on Election Day (or drop off, or 
mail, their ballot back)”). 
441. Section 203 of the VRA, codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10503(c) (2018), already requires covered ju-
risdictions to provide voting materials in additional languages and is thus a good precedent 
for this proposal. 
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option is voting via cell phone rather than via mailed ballot. Although there re-
main security issues with telephonic (and internet) voting, minority and non-
minority citizens now own cell phones at virtually identical rates.
442
 If these rates 
of cell-phone possession could be exported to the political sphere, racial differ-
ences in voting might be erased. 
conclusion 
In geology, an oxbow lake is a body of water that has become detached from 
a river’s main route. The lake lies near the river but is no longer part of it.
443
 This 
is essentially the relationship that now exists between disparate impact law and 
vote denial doctrine under section 2. Disparate impact law is the river in the an-
alogy: a broad waterway that holds within its banks Title VII, the FHA, and sev-
eral more statutes. Section 2 vote denial doctrine, in turn, is the oxbow lake: a 
small and strange lagoon cut off from, and so unaffected by, the flow of the cur-
rent. 
In this Article, I have argued that the oxbow lake should join the river—that 
disparate impact law, in other words, should be unified. Because of its isolation, 
section 2 vote denial doctrine has been stymied by questions the rest of disparate 
impact law answered long ago. Even worse, section 2 vote denial doctrine has 
failed to develop the feature—the justification defense—that bolsters the consti-
tutionality of the rest of disparate impact law. Linking the oxbow lake to the river 
would thus resolve a series of contentious issues and avert a looming threat to 
section 2’s validity. This merger also remains appealing despite the objections 
that have been raised to it and would be viable in every electoral context. It is 
time, then, for the civil engineers to get to work. A major hydrological project 
awaits them. 
 
442. See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet
/mobile [https://perma.cc/78Y2-245T] (showing white, black, and Hispanic smartphone 
ownership rates of 77%, 75%, and 77%, respectively). 
443. See Oxbow Lake, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia 
/oxbow-lake [https://perma.cc/KW3P-2L36]. Unlike an oxbow lake, of course, section 2 was 
not part of the disparate impact river at some previous point. 
